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I. INTRODUCTION
The results of the Philippine midterm elections saw the government
of Mr. Rodrigo Duterte triumph over its opposition. In the race for the
twelve available seats of the Philippine Senate, almost all were won
by candidates endorsed by Mr. Duterte as well as those who are allied
with him. The story was the same for the House of Representatives
Member of the Philippine Bar; Doctor of Philosophy (Candidate, the Australian
National University); Master of Laws (the University of Sydney); Juris Doctor
(University of the Philippines); Bachelor of Science in Applied Mathematics
(Ateneo de Manila University). The author expresses his gratitude to Ms Ruby
Rosselle L Tugade (Master of Laws, University for Peace) and Ms Patricia Mae D
Ali o (Master of Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Sydney) for their
invaluable insights.
. Jason Gutierrez, In Philippines Senate Elections, Duterte Sees Chance to
Consolidate
Power,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
,
),
https www.nytimes.com
world asia philippines-election-halalanresults.html; Reuters, Early Philippines Election Results Show President Rodrigo
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where the overwhelming number of lawmakers who won were in line
with the administration. Meanwhile, only a few of the candidates for
other offices who took stances contrary to that of Mr. Duterte
succeeded in the elections.
These victories translate to Mr. Duterte’s consolidation of power
over the government. It allows him to push for policies previously
hampered by the presence of a noticeable minority in the Philippine
Senate. This legislative support, amounting to a super-ma ority,
permits him to overhaul the country’s political system. It allows him
Duterte’s Allies Taking Lead, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (May
,
),
https www.abc.net.au news
- - philippines-election-early-results-showduterte-allies-in-lead
.
. See All the President’s Men: Independent or Rubber Stamp?, CTR. FOR
MEDIA FREEDOM
RESP. (June ,
), https cmfr-phil.org media-ethicsresponsibility ournalism-review all-the-presidents-men-independent-or-rubberstamp ( Nine out of the
are administration allies, including Ramon Bong’
Revilla Jr. who is facing graft charges, Ronald Bato’ Dela Rosa, who, as chief of
the Philippine National Police, was the first enforcer of President Rodrigo Duterte’s
brutal drug war, and Imee Marcos whose family history is marred by plunder and
fascism. ); Richard Javad Heydarian, Opinion, The Philippines’ Duterte: In Pursuit
of
an
Imperial
Presidency,
AL
JA EERA
(May
,
),
https www.al azeera.com indepth opinion philippines-duterte-pursuit-imperialpresidency.html (noting that President Duterte’s allies won a
significant part of the ,
elected offices).
. See, e.g., Aries Arugay, The 2019 Philippine Elections: Consolidating
Power in an Eroding Democracy, HEINRICH B LL STIFTUNG (June ,
),
https th.boell.org en
-philippine-elections-consolidating-powereroding-democracy (noting that the eight opposition candidates and other individual
candidates with anti-Duterte stance were not successful); Mikhail Flores
Cliff
Venzon, Duterte Allies Crush Opposition in Philippine Midterm Elections, NIKKEI
ASIAN REV. (May ,
), https asia.nikkei.com Politics Duterte-allies-crushopposition-in-Philippine-midterm-elections (explaining how Duterte’s popularity
has helped candidates that were friendly to his agenda and how the main opposition
candidates lost their seats); Raissa Robles, Philippine Election: ‘Duterte’s Magic
Routed Opposition’, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May
,
),
https www.scmp.com news asia southeast-asia article
philippineelection-vote-counting-glitch-rodrigo-duterte (reporting that it was clear that allies
of Duterte were winners in
of the
seats even before the vote count was
finalized).
. See Claire Jiao Andreo Calonzo, Death and Taxes Top Duterte’s Policy
Agenda Midway Through Term, BLOOMBERG (July
,
),
https www.bloomberg.com news articles
- - an-empowered-dutertesets-his-sights-on-drug-war-death-penalty (predicting that Duterte will be able to
avoid a lame-duck phase and push for his policy agenda by leveraging his
popularity and Congressional support in his remaining presidency).
. Id.
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to rewrite the constitution to scrap term limits, extend his tenure and
that of his allies, and change the system of government. The high level
of support also permits him to loosen legislative oversight, thereby
lessening the opportunities for congressional investigations and
precluding the filing of impeachment complaints. This, together with
a deferential udiciary, hampers the exercise of checks and balances
on executive power giving Mr. Duterte relatively free rein.
The success of Mr. Duterte’s government also demonstrates the
strength of its support from the electorate. Midterm elections may be
considered to be a referendum on the leadership and policies of the
incumbent, thus providing an opportunity to gauge the approval or
disapproval of the electorate regarding the policies of the
government. If this is the case, the government’s landslide victory
over its opposition, the latter not winning any senate seats, an
occurrence not seen since
, serves as an overwhelming
. See Richard Javad Heydarian, Midterm Massacre Hands Duterte All the
Power,
ASIA
TIMES
(May
,
),
https www.asiatimes.com
article midterm-massacre-hands-duterte-allthe-power (anticipating that Duterte will be able to overhaul the nation’s politics to
a federal system through the introduction of a new constitution); 2019 Midterm
Elections Results: Harsher Policies Ahead, IBON FOUND. (May
,
),
https www.ibon.org
-midterm-elections-results-harsher-policies-ahead .
. See Nestor Corrales, Palace on Impeach Raps: Duterte has Supermajority in
Congress, IN UIRER (July ,
), https newsinfo.in uirer.net
palaceon-impeach-raps-duterte-has-superma ority-in-congress
(reporting
on
the
Presidential spokesperson’s statement that an impeachment complaint against
Duterte will not succeed because of the president’s allies in Congress); Arianne
Merez, Impeach Duterte? Palace Says ‘It’s a Numbers Game’, ABS-CBN NEWS
(June ,
), https news.abs-cbn.com news
impeach-duterte-palacesays-its-a-numbers-game.
. See Dante Gatmaytan, Duterte, Judicial Deference, and Democratic Decay
in the Philippines,
EITSCHRIFT F R POLTIKWISEENSCHAFT
,
(
)
( extreme deference to the Chief Executive virtually erasing all the safeguards built
in the
Constitution . ).
. See Jim Gomez, Philippine Midterm Elections: A Crucial Referendum on
Duterte’s
Presidency,
DIPLOMAT
(May
,
),
https thediplomat.com
philippine-midterm-elections-a-crucialreferendum-on-dutertes-presidency.
. See Are the Midterm Elections Really a Referendum on President Duterte?,
BUSINESSWORLD (Jan. ,
), https www.bworldonline.com are-the-midtermelections-really-a-referendum-on-president-duterte; Richard Heydarian, Opinion,
Trump, Duterte and the Midterm Elections, IN UIRER (Nov.
,
),
https opinion.in uirer.net
trump-duterte-and-the-midterm-elections.
. See Lian Buan, Last Time Opposition Didn’t Win Any Legislative Seat was
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confirmation of the popular support en oyed by Mr. Duterte. Of
course, this does not serve to detract from the opposition’s failure in
its campaign strategy. Nevertheless, as shown by recent surveys,
Mr. Duterte still retains an extremely high approval rating, thereby
suggesting that Mr. Duterte’s success is more of a product of his
popular support rather than of the failure of the opposition.
The high regard placed by the populace on Mr. Duterte and his
government’s policies sounds alarming. The past three years of his
regime had been plagued by human rights issues, including, among
others, the attacks and threats made against critics and the unabated
and uninvestigated killings related to his campaign against illegal

80
Years
Ago,
RAPPLER
(May
,
),
https www.rappler.com newsbreak i
-last-time-opposition-did-not-winsenate-elections-years-ago.
. See Diana J. Mendoza, Why the Opposition Lost in the 2019 Midterm
(Senatorial)
Elections,
BUSINESSWORLD
(June
,
),
https www.bworldonline.com why-the-opposition-lost-in-the-midtermsenatorial-elections (attributing the defeat in the midterm election to the opposition
campaign’s strategy that turned the senatorial race into a zero-sum game and failure
to micro target voters).
. See, e.g., Second Quarter 2019 Social Weather Survey: Pres. Duterte’s Net
Satisfaction Rating at New Record-High “Very Good” +68, SOC. WEATHER
STATIONS
(July
,
),
http www.sws.org.ph swsmain artcldisppage artcsyscode ART(showing that the net satisfaction rating of the Duterte presidency
is at his personal record-high).
. See Arugay, supra note (suggesting people’s expectations on Duterte’s
ability to improve their plight and their perception that there is no viable leadership
alternative as some of the possible explanation for the high approval rate of the
Duterte presidency). But see Margaret Simons, Duterte’s Opposition in Disarray
Following Philippines Mid-Terms, LOWY INST. INTERPRETER (May
,
),
https www.lowyinstitute.org the-interpreter duterte-opposition-disarrayfollowing-philippines-mid-terms (criticizing the opposition’s lack of organization
and failure to make any impact on the continued popularity of Duterte).
. See Irene Hadiprayitno, Deadlock and Denial: Domestic Challenges and the
Institutionalization Human Rights in ASEAN,
GLOB. JURIST ,
(
),
https www-degruyter-com.proxyau.wrlc.org view ournals g
article.xml (exacerbated by the Duterte administration’s propensity toward
authoritarianism).
. See Leila de Lima, Opinion, President Duterte’s War on Drugs is a Pretense,
N.Y. TIMES (July ,
), https www.nytimes.com
opinion dutertephilippines-delima-drugs.html (opposition Senator); Red-Tagging, Intimidation vs.
Press: Duterte, State Agents Behind 69 Cases, PHIL. CTR. INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM (Dec. ,
), https pci .org .
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narcotics. Thus, these election results beg the uestion of whether the
Filipino populace has likewise subscribed to the illiberal mindsets and
authoritarian tendencies that Mr. Duterte exhibits.
This article submits that, as predicted during the first years of the
Duterte presidency, this may be so. The Philippines continues on its
slide towards illiberal democracy and authoritarian legalism
hampering its compliance with its human rights obligations. As
. See, e.g., Gideon Lasco, Don’t Call Philippines’ Duterte’s Anti-Drug
Campaign a ‘War on Drugs’, GLOBEPOST (Dec.
,
),
https theglobepost.com
philippines-duterte-drug-war ; Eloisa Lopez
Martin Perry, Philippine Drug War Critics Hope U.N. Probe Can Dent Duterte’s
Deadly Campaign, REUTERS (July ,
), https www.reuters.com article usphilippines-drugs-victims philippine-drug-war-critics-hope-u-n-probe-can-dentdutertes-deadly-campaign-idUSKCN U M.
. See generally Nicole Curato, We Need to Talk About Rody, in A DUTERTE
READER CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY PRESIDENCY ,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) (noting that President Duterte en oyed widespread
popularity, with an
percent trust rating six months into his presidency despite
his controversial statements and behaviours); RICHARD JAVAD HEYDARIAN, THE
RISE OF DUTERTE A POPULIST REVOLT AGAINST ELITE DEMOCRACY (
)
(citing Roberto Stefan Foa Tascha Mounk, The Signs of Deconsolidation,
J.
DEMOCRACY , (
)) (the European and World Values Survey shows that
of Filipino respondents agreed that a strong leader who does not have to bother with
parliament and elections is a good way to run the country); Raphael Lorenzo A.
Pangalangan et al., Marcosian Atrocities: Historical Revisionism and the Legal
Constraints on Forgetting, ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. L.
,
(
) (noting
that Duterte had included in his campaign agenda an amendment to the
Constitution and signed an Executive Order creating a committee to review the
Constitution once elected).
. See Walden Bello, Duterte’s Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, GLOB.
DIALOGUE (May ,
), http globaldialogue.isa-sociology.org dutertes-revoltagainst-liberal-democracy (criticizing that Duterte’s war on drugs ( ) was carried
out with a fanaticism bordering on the ideological and ustified with ideas
reminiscent of pseudo-scientific Nazi racial theory and ( ) stripped a whole sector
of society of the rights to life, due process, or membership in society ); Curato, supra
note , at
(illustrating that the Duterte administration considers human rights
as particular, not universal and the criticism from human rights watchdogs as
insensitive imposition of liberal Western values); Richard Heydarian, Opinion,
Duterte’s March to Illiberal Democracy: Philippine Political Elite Acquiesces in a
Rebirth
of
Populism,
NIKKEI
ASIAN
REV.
(Dec.
,
),
https asia.nikkei.com Opinion Duterte-s-march-to-illiberal-democracy
(cautioning about an ongoing, systematic campaign against democratic checks and
balances in favor of strongman leadership and noting that Duterte skillfully rallied
public support); James Massola, Democracy and Human Rights are in Retreat in
South-East Asia. Here’s Why, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. ,
),
https www.smh.com.au world asia democracy-and-human-rights-are-in-retreat-
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measures, domestic or foreign, to keep executive power in check have
been rendered ineffective, alternative tools have to be considered.
This article begins by examining the continued tolerance and
acceptance of the populace of Mr. Duterte’s disregard of liberal
democratic ideals and how such acceptance has translated to the
weakening of the rule of law and erosion of institutional mechanisms
for checks and balances. Next, it considers the effect of this tolerance
and acceptance on the state’s human rights obligations, particularly
that of the unabated extra udicial killings. Finally, it notes the
ineffectiveness of international instruments for compliance and
examines the utility of strengthening democratic non-governmental
institutions. It thus concludes that focus should be made on ensuring
that states have local tools to monitor, scrutinise, and reinforce the
government’s human rights policies.

II. OPENING FOR ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
From the liberal political order focused on good governance under
the previous administration, the Philippines took an illiberal turn
with Mr. Duterte. This is a move that has since been sustained. He
capitalised on the resentments of the electorate on, among others, the
stalled attempts in combatting corruption, inefficient institutions, and
concerns pertaining to crimes and illegal narcotics. With his
aggressive campaign, he was able to play to the impatience of
in-south-east-asia-here-s-why-p b b.html ( In Southeast Asia, almost
every day it seems another example emerges of the erosion of either the political and
civil rights of individual citizens, or the diminution of democratic institutions. ).
. See infra Part V.
. See Mark R. Thompson, Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of
Liberal Reformism in the Philippines,
J. CURRENT SE. ASIAN AFF. ,
(
)
(finding that the A uino administration’s undermined narrative of good
governance has made the administration vulnerable to replacement by violent
illiberalism).
. See, e.g., Dante Gatmaytan, Philippines: The State of Liberal Democracy, in
GLOBAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
,
(Richard Albert et al.
eds.,
) ( Philippine politics took a violently illiberal turn after Duterte’s election
in
. ).
. See id. at
(stating that the Duterte administration continues to undermine
the constitutional order).
. See Thompson, supra note , at
(noting that the success of Duterte
campaign was driven by middle-class concerns including drugs and crime,
crumbling infrastructure, and continued corruptions).
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populace and convince them to replace the liberal order that has seen
years of growth to one that consists of a new law-and-order governing
script and the uick removal of remaining liberal constraints.
Mr. Duterte exploited a form of grievance politics that played on
the failure of his predecessor, Mr. Benigno A uino III, to deliver on
his promises and the expectations he created. To recall, the latter
successfully ran on an agenda centred on reform and a drive against
corruption. However, while Mr. A uino demonstrated a strong
political will in prosecuting high profile cases involving government
officials, his administration’s efforts were hampered by outdated and
conflicting laws, udicial inefficiency, and deficient organizational
systems. To make matters worse, the efforts were marked with a
pattern of partiality and politicization. While some high-level
officials were prosecuted, those allied with the A uino government
were relatively unscathed. In turn, the institutional difficulties and
problematic implementations stalled his good governance program.
It is worth noting that the difficult enforcement of Mr. A uino’s
. Gatmaytan, supra note , at
.
. See HEYDARIAN, supra note
, at
(
) (particularly among the
burgeoning middle class and the aspirational middle class).
. See Pangalangan et al., supra note , at
(deploying the narrative of the
Tuwid na Daan’ (the Straight Path) in rallying his supporters ).
. See generally Eric Vincent C. Batalla, Treading the Straight and Righteous
Path: Curbing Corruption in the Philippines, ASIAN EDUC. DEV. STUD. ,
(
) (attributing the inade uacy of laws and of enforcement to the persistence of
endemic political and bureaucratic corruption).
. See id. at
(
) (showing a pattern of partiality and politicization in the
prosecutions of high-level corruption).
. See Joel R. San Juan, Legal Experts Confirm “Selective Justice” Under
Aquino, BUSINESSMIRROR (June
,
), www.businessmirror.com.ph legalexperts-confirm-selective- ustice-under-a uino ( double standard in
the
investigation and prosecution of corruption ); Thompson, supra note , at
(Prosecutions that were confined to A uino’s enemies increased cynicism about his
commitment to the rule of law ). See generally Jon S. T. uah, Curbing Corruption
in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream?,
CURRENT HIST.
,
(
)
(attributing low wages of civil servants and the cultural emphasis on familiar ties
and the cultural value of utang na loob’ (debt of gratitude) to the Philippine’s higher
tolerance of corruption).
. See Amy R. Remo, Good Governance Seen as Aquino Legacy, IN UIRER
(July
,
), https business.in uirer.net
good-governance-seen-asa uino-legacy (good governance reforms were seen as one of the A uino
administration’s most crucial achievements, but it was marked with some of the letdowns in the areas such as foreign investment and infrastructure programs).
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agenda is symptomatic of the deeper problems in the Philippine
political system. Its current state may be characterized as that of elite
governance dominated by an oligarchy that was buttressed by
patronage.
In this system, elite patrons furnish much-needed
resources to clients in exchange for support.
It is this kind of
governance that has made the system resistant to changes as the
narrow elite organizes it for their own benefit at the expense of the
vast ma ority of its citizens. With this resistance, the Philippines
continues to be plagued with dysfunctionality absent the much-needed
reforms to
realize genuine socioeconomic and political
transformations.
The problems of the Philippine political system are not limited to
its elite governance. Despite a fa ade of democratic political life, the
Philippines continues to suffer serious democratic deficits. While it
holds regular elections and has a democratic constitution, the system
is marked with a limited political space for opposition parties and
. See Julio C. Teehankee, Was Duterte’s Rise Inevitable?, in A DUTERTE
READER CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY PRESIDENCY ,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) (acknowledging the Philippine democracy’s significant
dysfunctionality, in which political and business elites resisted the much needed
reforms).
. See id. at . See generally Alfred W. McCoy, Preface: The Philippine
Oligarchy at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, in AN ANARCHY OF FAMILIES
STATE AND FAMILY IN THE PHILIPPINES xi, xi xii (Alfred W. McCoy ed.,
)
(attributing the rise of rents, or restrictive state license that allowed monopoly or
oligopoly over a particular market, and the Philippine being a problematic
postcolonial state to the survival of the Filipino oligarchy from generation to
generation); John T. Sidel, Philippine Politics in Town, District, and Province:
Bossism in Cavite & Cebu, J. ASIAN STUD.
(
) (introducing a theory that
attributes the existence of the political and economic elite families to the distinctive
institutional structures of the Philippine state, particularly those established under
the American colonial rule, rather than clientelism and class domination).
. See Pangalangan et al., supra note , at
( Elite governance has been the
cornerstone of political rule during various periods of the Philippine history ); see
also Julio C. Teehankee, Clientelism and Party Politics in the Philippines, in
CLIENTELISM AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN INDONESIA, THAILAND AND THE
PHILIPPINES
(Dirk Tomsa
Andreas Ufen eds.,
) hereinafter Party
Politics in the Philippines (providing the historical background and continued
influence of clientelism).
. See David T. Johnson
Jon Fern uest, Governing Through Killing: The
War on Drugs in the Philippines, ASIAN J.L. SOC’Y
,
(
).
. Teehankee, supra note , at .
. See Thompson, supra note , at
( systematic dis unction ).
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independent civil society.
Thus, there continues to be poor
representation of citizens interests, low levels of political participation
beyond voting, fre uent abuse of the law by government officials,
elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence
in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by
the state.
The A uino administration was ineffective in addressing these
deep-seated problems. During Mr A uino’s tenure, there had only
been a few ma or institutional reforms with the problems of the
Philippine ustice system being a particularly obvious unresolved
problem.
Fiscal policies were also sub ect to constitutional
challenges with hints of large-scale corruption. Finally, Mr. A uino
himself was widely seen to be part of the elite, having come from a
prominent and landed family.
It is not denied however, that the A uino administration was
marked with a robust growth. During his tenure there was strong
economic growth and improved credit ratings. However, despite
these gains, unemployment and poverty rates continued to remain
high. In general, Mr. A uino’s government failed to provide for an
inclusive development as evinced by marginal increases in the uality
of education and healthcare, efficient supply of basic goods,

. Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm,
J. DEMOCRACY
(
).
. Id.
. Thompson, supra note , at .
. See Pangalangan et al., supra note , at
(such as the Disbursement
Acceleration Program and the Priority Development Assistance Fund); accord 3
Years of Aquino Only Entrenched Elite Governance, CTR. PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT
GOVERNANCE
CENPEG
(July
,
),
https www.cenpeg.org
gov ul years of A uino only entrenched elite
governance.html ( Corruption and inept bureaucracy has driven away foreign
investments ).
. See Walden Bello, Aquino’s Elite Populism: Initial Reflections, THIRD
WORLD .
,
(
) (Mr. A uino is linked to two of the most prominent
landlord families in Central Luzon through blood and marriage).
. See Patricio N. Abinales, The Philippines Under Aquino III, Year 2: A
Ponderous Slog Continues,
SE. ASIAN AFF.
,
(
) ( The country’s
credit ratings had been upgraded by agencies like Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
to one level below investment grade. ).
. See HEYDARIAN, supra note , at (explaining that the underemployment
poverty hovered in the double-digit territory ).
,
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affordable utilities, and modernized public infrastructures. Thus, the
more the Philippines grew, the more obvious the gap in development
became. Without the robust welfare programs and high standards of
living seen in democracies that have reached a level of maturity, the
populace became all the more dissatisfied with the kind of political
order that Mr. A uino and his predecessors offered.
By tapping into the frustration with the business-as-usual style of
governance embedded in the country’s political and social
institutions, Mr. Duterte was able to package a narrative based on a
conflict between two homogenous and antagonistic groups the
people, on the one hand, and the elite, on the other, with him
championing the exasperation and fatigue of the former. He
capitalized on his local political background to solidify his status as a
political outsider. His vulgar discursive style enabled him to connect
with voters through its informality, and he portrayed himself as a
man of action capable of decisively and uickly solving deep-rooted
. See id. at ; Ben O. de Vera, As 69% of Pinoys Think Duterte ‘Better’ than
Aquino in Building Infra, Economic Team OKs 12 Projects Worth P626.1B,
IN UIRER.NET (Dec.
,
), https business.in uirer.net
as- -ofpinoys-think-duterte-better-than-a uino-in-building-infra-economic-team-oks- pro ects-worth-p - b.
. See HEYDARIAN, supra note , at .
. See id. at ( Deepened democracies . . . have robust welfare programs, with
individual citizens en oying a relatively high level of living standards, thanks to
universal healthcare and education. ); ADAM PR EWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD,
(
) (when the average income declines and ine uality increases,
democracies are more vulnerable than when the average income increases, and
ine uality is reduced); Carothers, supra note , at
(nothing the public’s
serious disaffection with politics and the inability of successive governments to
address ma or problems like crime and corruption, health, education, and public
welfare).
. Pangalangan et al., supra note , at
; HEYDARIAN, supra note , at .
. See Nathan Gilbert uimpo, Duterte’s “War on Drugs”: The Securitization
of Illegal Drugs and the Return of National Boss Rule, in A DUTERTE READER
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY PRESIDENCY
,
(Nicole
Curato ed.,
) (the people being pure in contrast to the corrupt elite).
. See Thompson, supra note , at .
. See id. at . See generally BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF
POPULISM PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND REPRESENTATION
(
)
(defining contemporary populism as a political style that features an appeal to the
people’ versus the elite,’ bad manners’ and the performance of crisis, breakdown
or threat ).
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problems. Thus, he was able to distance himself from the nation’s
political, business, and intellectual elite and appeal to a dissatisfied
populace. He also made efficient use of media to reach the electorate
through the spread of information and disinformation. A recent study
suggested that in the run-up to the elections, Mr. Duterte’s campaign
employed keyboard armies to spread propaganda through social
media. These armies had the task of orchestrating a unified
campaign message which would then be amplified through the
mechanisms of social media websites, thus generating a fa ade of
support.
After casting his image, Mr. Duterte tapped into the electorate’s
concerns regarding criminality. In this regard he put forward illegal
narcotics as the most significant issue, notwithstanding the fact that
the Philippines is a long way from narcotization and that there is no
evidence showing that drug traffickers have become virulent or
. uimpo, supra note , at
.
. See id.; Duncan McCargo, Duterte’s Mediated Populism,
CONTEMP. SE.
ASIA
,
(
) (Duterte’s campaign epitomized many of the populist trend
around the world such as the rise of anti-politician political candidate; the
declining relevance of conventional political parties and campaigning; the centrality
of TV-hyped super-sized personalities; the exploitation of voters’ fears and
resentments; and the merger of election rallies and protest movements with media
events and mass spectacles. ).
. See Hunter Holcombe, A “Dictator’s Playbook” Is Threatening Democracy.
This Woman Is Fighting Back, CBS NEWS (June
,
),
https www.cbsnews.com news maria-ressa-fake-news-real-conse uencesfighting-disinformation-duterte-philippines-cbsn-originals (calling social media
the dictator’s playbook ).
. See Samantha Bradshaw
Philip Howard, Troops, Trolls and
Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation
(Univ. of Oxford Computational Propaganda Research Pro ect, Working Paper No.
. ,
) ( Keyboard trolls were hired to spread pro-Duterte propaganda
during his campaign and presidency).
. See Jason Vincent A. Caba es Jayeel S. Cornelio, The Rise of Trolls in the
Philippines (and What We Can Do about It), in A DUTERTE READER CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY PRESIDENCY
,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) ( Trolls and bots have reportedly come together to sow fear and uncertainty
by threatening Duterte’s critics. ); see also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Surprised About
Mark Zuckerberg’s Secret Meeting with Trump? Don’t Be, GUARDIAN (Nov. ,
), https www.theguardian.com commentisfree
nov
surprised-aboutmark-zuckerbergs-secret-meeting-with-trump-dont-be (reporting that Facebook had
a staff in Duterte campaign and how use of Facebook helped Duterte victory).
. See Dante Gatmaytan, Lost in Transmission: Rule of Law Challenges in the
Philippines, IMPUNITY WATCH L.J. , (
).
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widespread at the national level.
He hyperbolized this issue to
demonstrate his tough on crime’ and man-of-action’ persona
thereby broadening his popular appeal. Thus, he was able to take a
manageable issue and transform it into a security matter. He
portrayed the problem to be one of significant importance that
threatened the security of the state and convinced the populace not ust
that he is the perfect person to lead the solving of the issue, but also
that exceptional measures were necessary to solve such a problem.
Finally, he also invoked a nostalgia for the peace and order, translating
it to the political and economic stability allegedly experienced during
the tenure of the Philippines’ previous authoritarian leader, Mr.
Marcos.
As mentioned earlier, the dis unction between the expectations from
a liberal political order and the state of the Philippines provided a
fertile ground for the rise of Mr. Duterte. In this state, the resulting
concerns have allowed the populace to be open to trade-offs. Thus,
. See uimpo, supra note , at
.
. See id. at
. See generally Peter Kreuzer, Private Political Violence
and Boss-Rule in the Philippines, BEHEMOTH ,
(
) ( Violence and
coercion are and always have been part and parcel of the Philippine variant of
clientelism. ).
. See uimpo, supra note , at
(defining the concept of securitization
and deeming a securitizing move successful if it convinces the targeted audience,
or at least gain its acceptance, about the existential threat and the need for the
exceptional measures to counter it ); cf. RALF EMMERS, NON-TRADITIONAL
SECURITY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC THE DYNAMICS OF SECURITI ATION
(
)
(on securitization of drug trafficking in Thailand).
. See Nicole Curato, Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and
Duterte’s Rise to Power,
J. CURRENT SE. ASIAN AFF. ,
(
) (applying
penal populism to Deterte’s case); uimpo, supra note , at
( The securitizing
move is deemed successful if it convinces the targeted audience, such as the public,
or at least gains its acceptance, about the existential threat and the need for the
exceptional measures to counter it. ). See generally JOHN PRATT, PENAL POPULISM
(
) (explaining the general concept of penal populism); Johnson Fern uest,
supra note ,
(explaining the use of penal populism in the Philippines);
Christian Houle Paul D. Kenny, The Political and Economic Consequences of
Populist Rule in Latin America,
GOV’T
OPPOSITION
,
(
)
(explaining that populism does not enhance turnout among all groups ).
. See Pangalangan et al., supra note , at
.
. See Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, J. HUM. RTS.
PRAC. , (
) ( People are now widely convinced that security can only be
achieved through making enormous trade-offs, whether in terms of freedom of
movement, privacy, non-discrimination norms, or even personal integrity
guarantees. ).
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citizens who once accepted democracy as the only legitimate form of
government become more open to authoritarian alternatives.
Simply, the importance of liberal order has been depreciated, the
possibility of authoritarian rule has been floated, and anti-liberal ideas
have been offered. Mr. Duterte took advantage of this vulnerability
of the Philippine political system and promised results through means
contrary to the principles of liberty and checks and balances which
liberal constitutionalism espouses. Accordingly, he has built a
formidable structure for challenging the liberal order and its values
by promoting methods he presents to be necessary to protect the rights
and interests of the broader society.
Mr. Duterte’s narrative, amounting to illiberal democracy,
continues three years after his election and has survived criticisms
from within and outside the Philippines, aided by the state machinery,
political defections, and an ineffective opposition. For one, being the
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at
; cf. AVERY POOLE, DEMOCRACY,
RIGHTS AND RHETORIC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (
) (giving examples of Thailand
and Indonesia).
. See Alston, supra note , at ( The new era of internal threats, which have
dramatically increased in recent years, is bringing with it a move to normalize states
of emergency. ).
. See Thompson, supra note , at ( Duterte’s promise to resort to violence
to solve the country’s drug problem . . . proved to be . . . effective during his
presidential campaign. ); Teehankee, supra note , at ( Duterte was able to tap
into the politics of anger’ fuelled by the general sense of frustration among the
voters and the growing desire for a strong leader to restore law and order. ). See
generally Amado Mendoza Jr., People Power’ in the Philippines, in CIVIL
RESISTANCE AND POWER POLITICS THE E PERIENCE OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION
FROM GANDHI TO THE PRESENT
,
(Adam Roberts Timothy Garton Ash
eds.,
); Benedict Anderson, Old Corruption, LONDON REV. BOOKS ,
(
) (explaining how there is no real political parties in the Philippines except
for the Communist Party and any attempt to return to the good, gold days is
doomed ); Fareed akaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,
FOREIGN AFF. ,
(
) (explaining shortcomings of liberal democracy).
. See Christopher Walker, Dealing with the Authoritarian Resurgence, in
AUTHORITARIANISM GOES GLOBAL THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY
,
(Larry Diamond et al. eds.,
); POOLE, supra note , at ( The current
government’s tough approach to crime is depicted as necessary to protect the rights
of broader society. ). See generally Andreas Schedler, What is Democratic
Consolidation?,
J. DEMOCRACY
,
(
) (explaining democratic
consolidation including challenges of democratic completion).
. See Jason Castaneda, Duterte Tightens Grip as the Philippines Falls Apart,
ASIA TIMES (Sept. ,
), https asiatimes.com
duterte-tightens-gripas-the-philippines-falls-apart (criticizing the extension of a state of national
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incumbent, Mr. Duterte has been in the position to maintain a
performative and a perceived substantive commitment to rapidly
deliver outcomes. He differentiated himself from his predecessor
who has often been bogged-down with institutional deficiencies.
More importantly, with the state apparatus at his disposal, Mr. Duterte
has the control over state information, and at times, disinformation.
Thus, like other authoritarian regimes, he has been able to shape the
political narrative to his strategic advantage. As was done during his
campaign, his government continues to employ keyboard armies to
spread a fa ade of support towards his policies, while at the same time
discrediting or intimidating those who criticize the government.
With his success and popularity, defections to Mr. Duterte’s side
has been rampant. This increases the consolidation of his power.
calamity for another year amid economic crisis, COVID outbreak, and declining
popularity as Duterte’s attempt to tighten his grip on the country before the
presidential election).
. See Arugay, supra note .
. See id. (describing the popular impatience among the Filipino people for the
democratic process Duterte’s predecessor took part in).
. See Jodesz Gavilan, From Marcos to Duterte: How Media Was Attacked,
Threatened,
RAPPLER
(Jan.
,
),
https www.rappler.com newsbreak i
-threats-attacks-philippines-mediatimeline (recounting the continuous threats and harassment against media outlets).
. See Ron Deibert, Cyberspace Under Siege, in AUTHORITARIANISM GOES
GLOBAL THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY
,
(Larry Diamond et al. eds.,
) (noting that authoritarian regimes now actively partake in cyber activities to
create strategic advantage); see also E. San Juan, Jr., Marcos and the Media, INDE
CENSORSHIP ,
(
) (discussing how former President of the Philippines
Ferdinand Marcos took over all the media to control the narrative); David
Rosenberg, Civil Liberties and the Mass Media Under Martial Law in the
Philippines, PAC. AFF.
,
(
) (describing how the Marcos government
changed the once-free Philippine press into one under his strict control).
. See JONATHAN CORPUS ONG JASON VINCENT A. CABA ES, POLITICS AND
PROFIT IN THE FAKE NEWS FACTORY FOUR WORK MODELS OF POLITICAL TROLLING
IN THE PHILIPPINES
(
) ( The state-sponsored model and its techni ues of
formal intimidation and digital bullying lead to silencing, self-censorship, and
chilling effects among dissenters and the public at large. Journalistic reports about
the state-sponsored propaganda model assume intentionally from the President
himself to intimidate and harass his critics. His message is taken forward by a socalled keyboard army, consisting of hyper-partisan political pundits, social media
influencers, and fans who call themselves diehard supporters. ); see also Bradshaw
Howard, supra note , at ,
(explaining how the Philippines is among the
list of governments that have run fake accounts to spread misinformation).
. See Thompson, supra note , at
(explaining that Duterte’s formerly
micro-party with one senator and three representatives became a ruling party
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True enough, during the last elections, the president has become a
centripetal force for different aspiring candidates in the senatorial and
local elections. The other effect of this consolidation is a weakened
opposition. The defections to the president’s ruling party decimated
the opposition and its resources. The opposition is unable to mount a
challenge against Mr. Duterte, let alone his populist governance.
Worsening the matter, the opposition has continued to rely on rhetoric
based on a liberal order without engaging Mr. Duterte’s narrative.
Simply put, while it may have been able to portray Mr. Duterte as an
authoritarian, it failed in countering the dissatisfaction with the order
they present let alone convince the electorate that the opposition is
up to the task of delivering what the populace expects without the
collateral damage it abhors.

III.

WEAKENED RULE OF LAW

In maintaining the power he has consolidated, Mr. Duterte does not
merely rely on the strength of his popular support, political clout, and
access to state machinery. He has also relied on the weakening of the
mechanisms supposedly in place to keep a check on the power of the
president. This is not to say, of course, that the Philippines has
through a process of defections).
. See Arugay, supra note .
. See With Midterms Approaching the Opposition is in ‘Dire Straits’ in the
Philippines,
WORLD
POL.
REV.
(Apr.
,
),
https www.worldpoliticsreview.com trend-lines
with-midtermsapproaching-the-opposition-is-in-dire-straits-in-the-philippines.
. See Agence France-Presse, Philippines Voters Back Duterte and His Drug
War as He Closes in on Midterms Victory, GUARDIAN (May
,
),
https www.theguardian.com world
may
philippines-mid-term-electionsduterte-closes-in-on-victory-senate.
. See Opposition Bets Failed to Counter Duterte Strongman Myth – Analyst,
RAPPLER
(May
,
),
https www.rappler.com nation politics elections
-opposition-failedcounter-duterte-strongman-myth (calling the opposition’s strategy that focused on
particular issue ineffective).
. See Diana Mendoza, Why the Opposition Lost in the 2019 Midterm
(Senatorial)
Elections,
BUS.
WORLD
(June
,
),
https www.bworldonline.com why-the-opposition-lost-in-the-midtermsenatorial-elections (noting that the opposition candidates lacked opportunities to
present themselves as better or strong contender because the administration
candidates stayed away from public debates).
. See Javier Corrales, Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela, J. DEMOCRACY
(
) (describing how some regimes give the president autocratic powers to
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completely transitioned into an authoritarian regime as it still retains
its democratic features. Mr. Duterte’s ruling party continues to
compete in elections, and the three branches of the government, along
with their promise of checks and balances, are still in existence.
However, if the last elections are to be considered the standard, there
is a marked decline in the competitiveness of its opposition. Further,
power appears to be concentrated on the executive considering that
legislative branch has become all the more subservient while the
udiciary remains relatively deferential.
Nevertheless, Mr. Duterte, in advancing his agenda, cannot simply
disregard the tenets of the law. After all, there is still some benefit in
maintaining a superficial appearance of democracy and legality. For
such benefit, his government continues to defend its actions by

weaken checks and balances during elections).
. See generally Agence France-Presse, supra note (showing the democratic
functions of elections in the Philippines).
. See generally Three Branches of Government, PHIL. INFO. AGENCY,
https pia.gov.ph branches-of-govt (last visited Oct. ,
).
. See Gutierrez, supra note (outlining how Duterte’s allies swept the Senate
elections); see also Arugay, supra note (explaining why Duterte had the entire
machinery of the Philippine state to out-resource his opponents and promote his own
candidates); Heydarian, supra note (describing how the opposition struggled with
limited resources and leadership in this election season); Flores Venzon, supra
note (stating that Duterte’s victory in the midterms was a massive blow for the
opposition); Andreo Calonzo et al., Opposition Crushed in Philippines Midterm
Vote
in
Nod
to
Duterte,
BLOOMBERG
(May
,
),
https www.bloomberg.com news articles
- - philippines-vote-countstalls-as-duterte-allies-take-lead (saying that the only opposition candidate that had
stood a chance of winning a seat landed in th place).
. See Carmel Veloso Abao, Engaging Duterte: That Space in Between
Populism and Pluralism, in A DUTERTE READER CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO
DUTERTE’S EARLY PRESIDENCY
,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) (stating that
Duterte’s udicial support is forecasted to grow as he appoints more udges, and
further that he has a super ma ority of allies within the legislature); see also
Gatmaytan, supra note , at
(describing how the Supreme Court refuses to
exercise its ability to check Duterte’s power); Lisandro E. Claudio Patricio N.
Abinales, Dutertismo, Maoismo, Nasyonalismo, in A DUTERTE READER CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY PRESIDENCY ,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) (asserting that Duterte seeks to become like his idol, Ferdinand Marcos).
. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, U. CHI. L. REV.
,
(
) (by using democratic mandates to launch legal reforms that remove
the checks on executive power, limit the challenge to their rules, and undermine the
crucial accountability institutions of a democratic state. ).

RISE OF ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
alleging that these are done within the bounds of the law. However,
with popular backing, his government is able to employ constitutional
or legal methods to remove checks on power, limit challenges to its
rule, and undermine the accountability of institutions while hiding its
autocratic designs.
The answer to the uestion of whether Mr Duterte adheres to the
rule of law is then a complicated one. Stripped of its rhetoric, the
concept pertains to a political ideal which a legal system may lack or
may possess to a greater or lesser degree. Simply put, it is ust one
of the virtues which a legal system may possess and by which it is to
be udged. From this, a non-democratic legal system that allows for
the denial of human rights, racism, gender ine ualities, and
persecution based on beliefs may be considered to conform with the
re uirements of the rule of law. While it does not conform with the
principles of ustice and e uality, it nevertheless may conform with
the rule of law in the sense that the law is consistently applied.
Without its technicalities, the rule of law simply implies that the
. See POOLE, supra note , at
(claiming that he is duty-bound by the
Constitution ); Thomas Pepinsky, Southeast Asia: Voting Against Disorder,
J.
DEMOCRACY
,
(
) (invoking their electoral legitimacy when seeking to
bypass legal channels).
. See Scheppele, supra note , at
,
; Susanne Baer, Rule of—and
not by any—Law. On Constitutionalism,
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
,
(
) (describing how Duterte and his allies disguise their attacks on the rule of
law as legal arguments that are a legitimate part of the lawmaking process); Laurent
Pech Kim Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU,
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. , (
) (enumerating the process autocrats
go through to attack the rule of law, including taking advantage of disgruntled
citizens and using them to ustify subse uent violations); akaria, supra note , at
(explaining how illiberal democracies are often rooted in democratically elected
regimes that ignore constitutional limits and listing the Philippines as one such
regime).
. See Scheppele, supra note , at
,
(describing how autocrats can
use a combination of legitimate elements of democracy to form a system in which
they end up with all the power, while maintaining the external appearance of a
legitimate democracy).
. JOSEPH RA , THE AUTHORITY OF LAW ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY
(
).
. See id.; accord Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested
Concept (in Florida)?,
L. PHIL.
,
(
) (claiming that the term rule
of law is available for indiscriminate use, and as such can be easily misused).
. See Waldron, supra note , at
.
. See Scheppele, supra note , at
.
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government’s actions are constrained by a fixed set of rules of which
the governed has been informed. This allows the public to foresee
with fair certainty how the government will use its powers and act
accordingly based on this knowledge. Taken broadly, this means
that people should obey the law and be ruled by it. In the narrower
sense, the concept dictates that the government shall be ruled by the
law and sub ect to it
a government by law and not by men.
Hence, the only actions that the law allows are considered actions of
the government as government. Otherwise, these acts would be
without legal effect.
As discussed earlier, the idea of the rule of law’ does not amount
to the conception of ustice, e uality, or democracy. It remains
distinct from the scheme of ustice established by any particular legal
. See F.A. Hayek, Preface to the 1976 Edition, in THE ROAD TO SERFDOM ,
(Bruce Caldwell ed.,
) (stating that experts believe that if Hitler had risen to
power in a constitutional manner, one could say that Germany adhered to the rule of
law). Compare H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
HARV. L. REV.
(
) (providing an analysis on the distinction between law and
morals), with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor
Hart,
HARV. L. REV.
(
) (discussing how the distinction between law
and morals should be a distinction between order and good order instead).
. See Paul Craig, Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis,
L. .
REV. ,
(
) (stating that legitimate expectations of the public are an
important factor when considering procedural rights); Fuller, supra note , at
(claiming that if people are compelled by law to do the right thing, they will
generally act accordingly); see also J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(
) (describing how a legal system exemplifies the rule of law in part by
creating prospective rules that are firm enough to guide the public); LON FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW
(
) (defining the rule of law was the existence of
public order, and stating that as such, all modern societies follow the rule of law
including fascist, socialist, and liberal states); P.P. Craig, Substantive Legitimate
Expectations in Domestic and Community Law, CAMBRIDGE L.J.
,
(
)
(describing how the public’s legitimate expectations of, inter alia, natural ustice and
fairness, come from a public body acting in such a way that the expectation is
created).
. RA , supra note , at
.
. Id.
. See id.
. See id.; see also Miro Cerar, The Ideology of the Rule of Law,
ARCHIV
F R RECHTS-UND SO IALPHILOSOPHIE
ARCHIVE PHILOSOPHY L.
SOC.
PHILOSOPHY
,
(
) (describing how the autonomous power of law in an
authoritarian or totalitarian government is minimal and negligible).
. See RA , supra note , at
( The rule of law is not to be confused with
democracy, ustice, e uality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind
or respect for persons or for the dignify of man. ).
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regime and is compatible with many rival accounts of social
ustice.
In a sense, it does not entail a commitment to any
particular vision of the public good or any specific conception of social
ustice.
What it re uires is conformity to the rule of law’ in order
to secure whatever purposes the law is designed to achieve.
The
rule of law therefore is the specific excellence of law in the sense that
it is the virtue of efficiency.
Thus, adherence to the rule of law
enables the law to achieve its ends, ust as a sharp knife can more
readily be used for cutting.
Therefore, on its own, the rule of law is meaningless. If
anything, it could be demonstrated that it is e ually compatible with
some forms of authoritarian rule as it is with a liberal democratic
order. But the rule of law’ discussed in relation to and sought in the
democratic context is one that goes beyond mere legality or that which
re uires only formal legal authorisation for governmental acts and
decisions.
What is sought is a conception that re uires more
substantial re uirements which is that of constitutionalism. As had
been aptly put, sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the
rule of law may make law barren and empty.
At its core, constitutionalism imposes limitations on the state,
particularly in its relations with citizens, based on a clearly defined
set of core values.
At the same time, it re uires the existence of
. T.R.S. Allan, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent &
Constitutionalism,
L. . REV.
,
(
).
. Id. at
; see J. Shklar, Political Theory and Rule of Law, in POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND POLITICAL THINKERS
(S. Hoffman ed.,
).
. See Allan, supra note
, at
.
. See id.
. T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE
OF LAW
(
).
. See Shannon C. Stimson, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, in THE
O FORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY
,
(John Dryzek et al. eds.,
).
. See JOSEPH RA , THE AUTHORITY OF LAW ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY
(
) (stating that the rule of law is only one of many virtues a legal system
should include).
. See Allan, supra note
, at
.
. See id.
. RA , supra note
, at
.
. See Gatmaytan, supra note
, at
; see also Yasmin Dawood, The
Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, GEO. L.J.
,
(
) (stating that one of the main goals of the rule of law is similar to
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limitations on the government that can be legally enforced.
It is
worth noting, however, that in some instances, constitutionalism and
democracy may exist in tension as when what the people want at any
given moment is over-ridden by constitutional principles that thwart
that desire
Nevertheless, democratic constitutionalism resolves this
tension between democracy and constitutionalism by baking into
constitutionalism the re uirement of a self-sustaining democracy, a
system in which the people can continue over time choosing their
leaders, holding them to account, and rotating power when leaders
disappoint.
Similarly, liberal constitutionalism reinforces democracy because it
imposes two important constraints on the government. First, it re uires
the state to protect and defend the dignity and liberty of individuals
so that they may sustain, among other things, the capacities to be
democratic citizens.
Second, it mandates that all sources of public
power be sub ect to binding legal checks that, among other things,
ensure that leaders stay within legal limits and guarantee the orderly
rotation of leadership in response to shifting democratic ma orities.
constitutionalism in that they both aim to protect against unchecked dominion by the
state); Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional
Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role of Political Parties: Lessons and
Perspectives from Southern Africa,
AM. J. COMP. L. , (
) (describing how
modern constitutionalism aims to limit government power and simultaneously
ensure the government functions efficiently and effectively within those limits);
Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD , (Douglas Greenberg et al eds.,
) (explaining that constitutionalism
seeks to respect human worth and dignity by placing limits on what the government
can do); Vicki C. Jackson, What’s in a Name? Reflections on Timing, Naming, and
Constitution-Making,
WM. MARY L. REV.
,
(
) (outlining the
core principles of constitutionalism, including avoiding use of force, preserving
human rights, stability of law, and maintenance of an effective government).
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at .
. See Scheppele, supra note
, at
; see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies,
TE . L. REV.
,
(
) (stating that constitutionalism is inherently at odds with ma oritarian rule
because the laws set to limit the government and protect the people go on to limit
the will of the people themselves).
. Scheppele, supra note , at
; see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
,
,
(
) (highlighting
the importance of voting in a democracy as it relates to constitutionalism).
. See id. at
.
. See id.
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Yet, this observance of the rule of law that democratic and liberal
constitutionalism both re uire is what the regime of Mr. Duterte
lacks. It may definitely be legal but whether it adheres to the
principles of democratic and liberal constitutionalism is a different
matter. Under Mr. Duterte’s government, efforts are made to
maintain a fa ade of legitimacy or subscription to core concepts,
ideas, and ideals while in the process of doing so endeavour to
destroy the same.
It can be said then that the kind of order that Mr. Duterte
demonstrates is that of a hybrid one. While his regime participates in
the exercise of democracy, as in the case of elections, it nevertheless
uses this purely ma oritarian conception of democracy to effect
changes that are contradictory to liberal and democratic constitutional
order. Accordingly, like other legalistic autocrats, Mr. Duterte uses,
abuses, and in some cases disregards laws in order to consolidate
political power, legitimize self-serving legal reforms, and silence
opposition.
Several instances demonstrate Mr. Duterte’s use of law towards
authoritarian ends. For one, as a vast ma ority of the members of
Congress have migrated to his ruling party, the legislative branch now

. See David G. Timberman, Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm
Assessment, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (Jan.
,
),
https carnegieendowment.org
Philippine-politics-under-dutertemidterm-assessment-pub(In
, the Philippines withdrew from being
considered for a second Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact,
because it no longer met the MCC’s minimum re uirements in the areas of rule of
law and corruption control.).
. See id. (discussing how the Duterte government’s actions have led to
significant democratic backsliding and human rights violations).
. See Baer, supra note , at
.
. See Scheppele, supra note , at
; see also Corrales, supra note , at
(describing hybrid regimes as competitive authoritarian systems, because although
there is an election, the powers the president wins fit that of an autocrat, and as such,
erode checks and balances).
. See, e.g., id. at
(using Venezuela’s rule as an example of autocratic
legalism, whose three elements are the use, abuse, and non-use of the law to serve
the executive branch); Baer, supra note , at
(citing Poland as an example
of a government that changed internal working rules that weakened the power of the
court, reallocated that power to the executive branch, and morphed the rule of law
into simply whichever laws get passed rather than a constitutional, rights-based rule
of law).
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ac uiesces to his dictates. Thus, when the Commission on Human
Rights began investigating the extra- udicial killings committed
within the government’s campaign against illegal narcotics, the
legislative branch gave the commission a budget of a mere one
thousand pesos effectively rendering it useless. Its budget was only
restored after public outrage became clear and unrelating.
Perhaps
even more concerning is the agenda of the government in reforming
the constitution. Currently, Mr. Duterte has the numbers to convene a
constitutional assembly’ and propose the changes that he wants. If
effected, such a change may perpetuate the incumbents’ time in
office.
In other instances, Mr. Duterte has resorted to the abuse of law,
rather than its use. Abuse in this sense pertains to the inconsistent and
biased implementation of laws and regulations.
In most cases, it
has been done to silence the government’s opposition. For instance,
when one of Mr. Duterte’s critics, Senator Leila M. De Lima, called
for an investigation of extra- udicial killings, the government charged
the Senator with counts of drug trafficking with prisoners in the New
Bilibid Prison on the outskirts of Manila.
Worth mentioning is the
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at
.
. House Gives CHR ₱1,000 Budget for 2018, CNN (Sept.
,
),
http nine.cnnphilippines.com news
Commission-on-Human-RightsCHR-House-budget.html; Joseph Hincks, In the Philippines, Human Rights Have a
Precise Value: $20, TIME (Sept. ,
), https time.com
philippineshuman-rights-budget-rodrigo-duterte.
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at
; see also Katrina Domingo, Gascon:
CHR Budget Restored Due to Public Outrage, ABS-CBN NEWS (Sept. ,
),
https news.abs-cbn.com news
gascon-chr-budget-restored-due-topublic-outrage (stating that the Commission on Human Rights chair attributed the
budget restoration to the public outcry following the decision to cut it down).
. See Mara Cepeda, Duterte Wants Constituent Assembly to Amend
Constitution
–
Alvarez,
RAPPLER
(July
,
),
https www.rappler.com nation duterte-constituent-assembly-federalism-alvarez.
See generally CONST. (
), art. VII,
(Phil.).
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at
. See generally Pangalangan et al.,
supra note , at
(discussing Duterte’s plans to change the constitution).
. Corrales, supra note , at .
. See Editorial Board, Opinion, Rodrigo Duterte has Accelerated the
Philippines’ Slide Toward Authoritarianism, WP (July
,
),
https www.washingtonpost.com opinions global-opinions rodrigo-duterte-hasaccelerated-the-philippines-slide-toward-authoritarianism.html.
. See, e.g., Johnson Fern uest, supra note , at
; see also Jayson S.
Lamchek, A Mandate for Mass Killings: Public Support for Duterte’s War on Drugs,

RISE OF ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
fact that the Senator was charged with no evidence aside from the
testimonies of convicted prisoners. Mr. Duterte also retaliated
against the Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court who has
been considered to have been part of the minority in the Court in a
series of high-profile cases brought against the current
administration.
The Chief Justice notably resisted some of Mr
Duterte’s policies on the grounds that they flouted human rights and
the rule of law.
Subse uently, an impeachment complaint was filed
against the Chief Justice before the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice composed chiefly of Mr. Duterte’s allies. She
was eventually ousted through a legally uestionable petition before
the Supreme Court filed by the government’s Office of the Solicitor
General. Moreover, members of the press have not been spared from
attacks. For instance, numerous charges have been brought against
Maria Ressa, a ournalist critical of Mr. Duterte. These charges ranged
from cyber-libel to violating laws on the foreign ownership of media
outlets. Similarly, he has threatened the closure of a ma or network
in A DUTERTE READER CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY
PRESIDENCY
,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) (explaining that even the civil
society groups such as the one that brought the charges against Senator De Lima
have urged Duterte to stop killing innocents).
. See Johnson Fern uest, supra note , at
.
. See Gemmo Bautista Fernandez, The Theory of Judicial Impartiality and the
Case of Republic v Chief Justice Sereno,
AUS. J. ASIAN L. , (
); Felipe
Villamor, She Stood Up to Duterte. Now She Faces Impeachment., N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
,
),
https www.nytimes.com
world asia philippines-chiefustice-duterte.html.
. Villamor, supra note
.
. See Jim Gomez, Philippines’ Chief Justice Expects Impeachment, Taking
Leave,
AP
(Feb.
,
),
https apnews.com
ab
a c aac d b b bdc Philippines’-chiefustice-expects-impeachment,-taking-leave.
. See Fernandez, supra note
, at .
. See Joanna Fuertes-Knight, Attacks on the Media Show Duterte’s Philippines
is
Heading
for
Despotism,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
,
),
https www.theguardian.com commentisfree
feb
attacks-media-dutertephilippines-rappler-maria-ressa (describing cases of several critics from the media
that were arrested on bogus charges); see also Rambo Talabong, Over 100 Attacks
VS Journalists Since Duterte Assumed Office – Monitor, RAPPLER (May ,
),
https www.rappler.com nation
-over- -attacks-vs- ournalists-duterteassumed-office (listing the large amount of attacks on the media by the number of
cases and how many cases each medium was involved in).
. See Alexandra Stevenson, Maria Ressa, Journalist Critical of Duterte, is
Arrested Again in Philippines, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
,
),
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which has been critical of his policies by instructing Congress not to
renew its franchise.
Finally, there is the non-use of law. Notably, the Philippine
Constitution has codified, bureaucratized, and proceduralized human
rights so that the law is easily used.
Yet, it appears to have ended
there a formalistic conception of human rights.
For instance,
there is the lack of investigations conducted in the extra- udicial
killings that have happened since Mr. Duterte came to power.
Instead, the government has resorted to a multitude of tactics ranging
from denial, deflection, and recalibration in all cases without
substantiating defenses and serious investigation. Even more, there
had been instances when the non-use of law has been blatant such as
when Mr. Duterte threatened to abolish the Commission on Human
Rights which is constitutionally mandated to investigate abuses of
human rights.
Another instance is when Mr. Duterte warned the
Ombudsman not to investigate police or military involvement
without seeking his permission first .
Still, Mr. Duterte has
fre uently warned courts not to interfere with his policies and that
should they do so, he will not respect their authority a blatant

https www.nytimes.com
business media maria-ressa-arrestedphilippines-rappler.html.
. See Duterte Threatens to Shut Down Philippine Broadcaster ABS-CBN, CPJ
(Dec. ,
), https cp .org
duterte-threatens-to-shut-down-philippinebroadcas.php; Duterte to ABS-CBN: Next Year, You’re Out, CNN PHIL. (Dec. ,
), https www.cnnphilippines.com news
duterte-abs-cbn-franchiseout.html.
. See Irene Hadiprayitno, Deadlock and Denial: Domestic Challenges and the
Institutionalization Human Rights in ASEAN,
GLOB. JURIST , (
).
. See id.
. See Jodesz Gavilan, Lian Buan, Rambo Talabong, Duterte Gov’t Allows
‘Drug War’ Deaths to Go Unsolved, RAPPLER (Jan.
,
),
https www.rappler.com newsbreak in-depth duterte-government-drug-wardeaths-unsolved (stating that the police have not investigated the ,
deaths that
resulted from police operations); see also OHCHR, DRUG-RELATED OFFENCES,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSES AND THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (
) (explaining that some sources uote a death toll of over ,
people as a result of police-led drug operations, and Special Procedures has released
several press statements condemning the lack of investigations).
. See Lamchek, supra note
, at
.
. See id.
. See Hadiprayitno, supra note , at .
. See id.
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disregard of the principle of separation of powers.
The fact that the udiciary has been relatively deferential is also a
problem.
Despite its broad powers of review, the Supreme Court
has been unwilling to assume its . . . role as a check on executive
powers. During the past few years, Mr. Duterte has won every case
that challenged his actions before the Supreme Court. In turn, this
contributes to Mr. Duterte’s ability to generate tolerance for his
policies.

IV.

EFFECT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

The previous sections contextualized the problems facing the
enforcement of human rights in the Philippines where the rule of law
has been reduced to its minimalist form and the populace have been
made open to accept an illiberal order. In turn, this openness translates
to an open season for the Mr. Duterte’s government to enact its
policies without the hindrance of oversight or fear of repercussions
related to public perception of there being an erosion of the
appreciation for basic liberties, individual autonomy, and dignity.
Of course, the problem concerning the enforcement of human rights
in the Philippines is not new. For one, the existence of extra- udicial
killings in the Philippines is not a new phenomenon. From the time
. See Villamor, supra note
(reporting on a Duterte spokesperson’s call for
the high court’s Chief Justice to resign); Alexis Romero, Duterte Pushes 2 Dams for
Metro Manila, Warns Courts, PHIL. STAR
(Dec.
,
),
https www.philstar.com headlines
Duterte-pushes- -damsmetro-manila-warns-courts (Duterte warning that an adverse ruling will not be
respected by the executive). See generally Jeffrey Damicog, Guevarra Backs
President’s Warning to Courts vs Issuing TROs, Injunctions, MANILA BULL. (Dec.
,
), https news.mb.com.ph
guevarra-backs-presidents-warningto-courts-vs-issuing-tros-in unctions .
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at
(arguing that such deference contributes
to democratic decay).
. See id.
. See id. at
. See generally Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No.
(S.C., July ,
) (Phil.); Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
(S.C.,
July ,
) (Phil.); Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
(S.C., Nov. ,
)
(Phil.).
. See generally Alston, supra note , at ; akaria, supra note , at , .
. E.g., Bede Sheppard
A. Lin Neumann, Scared Silent: Impunity for
Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippine, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June
,
),
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of the late dictator, Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, extra- udicial executions
have been a regular feature of Philippine society.
Under Mr.
Marcos’ rule,
,
people became victims of enforced
disappearances. This prevalence continued during the time of Mr.
Duterte’s predecessors. An estimated
people become victims of
extra- udicial, summary, or arbitrary execution during the first half
of Mrs. Gloria Macagapal-Arroyo’s government. Similarly, during
the time of Mr. A uino, at least
leftist activists, human rights
defenders, and alleged supporters of communist rebels were killed.
While there was a marked decline in these killings during the time of
Mr. A uino, it is also notable that little was done to find and prosecute
their perpetrators.
As pointed out, the lack of successful
prosecutions meant there’s nothing to prevent an upsurge of abuses
in the future.
This appears to be an aptly put observation the
warning would prove to be prophetic.
Mr. Duterte made true of his election promise to eliminate those
involved in illegal drugs enough to fatten the fish in the Manila
Bay. Within a few days of his inauguration, the Philippine National
Police and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency began
implementing his deadly campaign. Names of suspected users and
https www.hrw.org report
scared-silent impunity-extra udicialkillings-philippines (detailing killings since
).
. See Johnson Fern uest, supra note , at
.
. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation,
F. Supp.
,
(D. Haw.
); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
F. d
,
(
);
Pangalangan et al, supra note , at
.
. See Florin Terna Hilbay, The Philippine President as Tortfeasor-in-Chief:
Establishing Civil Liability for Constitutional Negligence, ASIAN J. COMP. L. , ,
n. (
).
. Johnson Fern uest, supra note , at
.
. See Acor Arceo, Aquino’s Human Rights Record a ‘Failure’ – Watchdog,
RAPPLER (Jan.
,
), https www.rappler.com nation human-rights-watcha uino-failure (noting state-sponsored killings almost never result in
prosecutions).
. Id.
. See Johnson
Fern uest, supra note
, at
(characterizing such
warnings as prescient ); see also Arceo, supra note
(detailing
killings).
. See Jim Gomez, Duterte ‘Happy to Slaughter’ Drug Suspects; Mentions
Hitler,
AP
(Sept.
,
),
https apnews.com article a bd
e
bbcd
e .
. See Memorandum from the Phil. Nat’l Police Comm’n, PNP Anti-Illegal
Drugs Campaign Plan Pro ect Double Barrel
,
(July ,
) (on file
with Phil. Nat’l Police Comm’n).
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sellers were gathered and those listed were asked to turn themselves
in. Those who failed to do so became likely targets for extra- udicial
execution. The campaign also included what may be described as
mass interrogations where tens or hundreds of men are called out
of their homes, lined up, arrested, and uestioned.
Some of these
men would later be also killed.
Three years later, the number of
deaths arose to around ,
. The deaths commonly occurred in
police operations and, in other cases, in the hands of alleged vigilantes.
The government has fre uently denied claims of extra- udicial
killings, asserting that the victims died as a result of shootouts
between the police officers and suspects or violent resistance on the
part of the suspects.
However, the unusually high death rate in
these operations suggests that the suspects had been summarily
gunned down.
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the deaths
are e ually telling. Suspected offenders have received warnings from
. See Johnson Fern uest, supra note ,
.
. See id. at
.
. See id. at
.
. See Johnathan Kaiman, The Philippines’ Drug Addicts, Shunned by Society
and Hunted by Assassins, Find They Have Nowhere to Turn, L.A. TIMES (Sept. ,
),
https www.latimes.com world asia la-fg-philippines-addicts-snapstory.html (reporting that more than ,
suspected drug dealers have been killed).
. See, e.g., Emmanuel Tupas, 29,000 Deaths Probed Since Drug War
Launched,
PHIL.
STAR
(Mar.
,
),
https www.philstar.com nation
-deaths-probed-drugwar-launched.
. See Kristine Joy Patag, Philippines to UN Rights Council: Panel to Look into
Deaths in Anti-drug Operations, PHIL. STAR (June
,
),
https www.philstar.com headlines
philippines-un-rightscouncil-panel-look-deaths-anti-drug-operations (describing investigations of law
enforcement officers who overstepped legal bounds in their operations).
. See Ateneo Hum. Rts. Ctr. AHRC , Summary Extra udicial Killings in
the Philippines A Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council for the
Universal Periodic Review of the Philippines,
, (
). See generally Gerg
Cahiles, PNP Chief Defends Police in Drug-Related Killings, CNN PHIL. (July ,
), https cnnphilippines.com news
bato-defends-police-in-drugrelated-killings.html; Cecille Suerte Felipe, ‘Bato’ to Cops: I will Kill You, Too,
if . . .
,
PHIL.
STAR
(June
,
),
https www.philstar.com headlines
bato-cops-i-will-kill-youtoo-if; Lamchek, supra note
, at
,
.
. Sheila Coronel, Murder as Enterprise: Police Profiteering in Duterte’s War
on Drugs, in A DUTERTE READER CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S
EARLY PRESIDENCY
(Nicole Curato ed.,
).
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police and officials that they were on the watchlist. Later, men
would come to houses of these suspects to take them and execute them.
In some cases, policemen were nearby, securing the crime scene,
with special crime investigators arriv ing within minutes of the
kill.
Notwithstanding these observations, the government
maintains its uestionable position even though there have been
reports that police had planted guns, ammunition, and drug packets
on victims’ bodies to support the claim of legitimate operations.
Furthermore, the govenment has frustrated efforts by the media and
independent observers to verify the tally of deaths and has resorted
to the manipulation of the online information landscape to generate
a fa ade of support for the administration.
Worse, the government appears to be tolerant of these killings, if
not supportive; there is a marked inaction on the part of the
government to investigate the killings. The only exception came in
November of
when three police officers were found criminally
responsible for the murder of a minor which remains, until now, the
only criminal conviction of authorities in the narcotics campaign.
All other implicated officers in the killings received only minor
disciplinary sanctions or escaped ustice. Notably, the president
himself vowed to pardon any police or military personnel involved in
the extra udicial killings and stated that he would stand trial on behalf
of police officers if they were accused of unlawful killing.
Surprisingly, while the Philippine system of governance has a range
of mechanisms for checks and balances, none have been brought to
.
.
.
.

See id.
See id.
Id. at
.
See HRW, WORLD REPORT
(
); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
REPORT
THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS
(
).
. See id. at
; Freedom on the Net 2017: Philippines, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https freedomhouse.org country philippines freedom-net
(last visited Sept.
,
). See generally uimpo, supra note , at
,
.
. See UNHRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review on its Thirty-Sixth Session, (b), U.N. Doc. A HRC
.Add (Sept. ,
); AHRC, supra note
,
.
. People v Oares, Crim Case No CRegional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Regional, Branch
, Caloocan City, (Nov. ,
) (Phil.).
. Dahlia Simangan, Is the Philippine “War on Drugs” an Act of Genocide?,
J. GENOCIDE RES. , (
).
. See AHRC, supra note
,
.
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bear.
The legislative branch, as previously noted, had been
subservient to Mr. Duterte.
With a near-superma ority in both
houses of Congress, the legislative branch ac uiesces to Mr. Duterte’s
command. To be sure, no serious probe has been made to investigate
the killings under the government’s campaign against illegal narcotics.
The last investigation resulted in the government’s charging of the
chair of the Senate committee conducting the probe with narcoticsrelated offences leading to her imprisonment. To add insult to the
in ury, the former police chief who was behind the government’s
campaign has been elected a senator and would now be part of the
committee poised to investigate the killings.
The effectiveness of the Commission on Human Rights of the
Philippines has also been in uestion. Notably, the Commission has
the primary mandate of investigating human rights abuses, yet it is
relatively powerless. While it may investigate, it only has a
recommendatory power to call for prosecution. It cannot prosecute
by itself. The authority remains with the Department of Justice, an
executive department, and the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at
(exploring the courts’ refusal to use their
power to check the executive).
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at
(stating that Duterte has imposed
martial law and initiated impeachments against other high-level officials).
. See id.
. See Eloisa Lopez Martin Petty, Philippine Drug War Critics Hope U.N.
Probe Can Dent Duterte’s Deadly Campaign, REUTERS (July
,
),
https www.reuters.com article us-philippines-drugs-victims philippine-drug-warcritics-hope-u-n-probe-can-dent-dutertes-deadly-campaign-idUSKCN U M
(detailing the Duterte regime’s unwillingness to allow investigations into the
killings).
. See Johnson Fern uest, supra note , at
; Jayson Lamchek, supra note
, at
.
. See Aika Rey, Bato dela Rosa Won’t Inhibit from Senate EJK Probe: ‘Ako
Ba Pumatay?’, RAPPLER (June ,
), https www.rappler.com nation
bato-dela-rosa-not-inhibit-from-senate-extra udicial-killings-investigation (stating
Ronald dela Rosa claimed he would not be biased because he is no longer a police
officer).
. See Phil Robertson, Philippines in Hot Seat at UN Rights Council, HRW
(June
,
), https www.hrw.org news
philippines-hot-seat-unrights-council (describing the panel as deeply flawed ).
. See CONST. (
), art. III,
( ) (Phil.).
. See id.
. See Senator Leila M. De Lima, Dissenting Report to the Joint Committee
Report No. , at
(Dec. ,
) (Phil.).
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violations of human rights.
Both are free to disregard the
recommendations of the Commission.
Nevertheless, the
Commission has been proactive in communicating the results of its
investigations to the public and calling for accountability in the
government’s illegal narcotics campaign. The problem is, the
Commission, like any of the government’s critics, is often targeted by
Mr. Duterte and his allies. It has fre uently been branded as
useless as it only defends only the rights of criminals and goes after
only the police and government officials.
Thus, it has been
fre uently discredited before the perception of the public which in turn
affects the credibility of its findings.
Finally, despite these rampant human rights violations, the populace
appears to remain supportive of Mr. Duterte’s policies concerning
illegal narcotics. As aforementioned, Mr. Duterte tapped into the
anxieties of the populace about criminality in relation to the problem
concerning illegal narcotics. The truth is, while illegal narcotics are
. See id.
. See id.
. See, e.g., Krissy Aguilar, CHR Wants Gov’t to Intensify Efforts to Deliver
Justice for All EJK Victims, IN UIRER.NET (Nov.
,
),
https newsinfo.in uirer.net
chr-wants-govt-to-intensify-efforts-todeliver- ustice-for-all-e k-victims (discussing Commission Chair Chito Gascon’s
public call for the government to step up their efforts in helping victims of
extra udicial killings).
. See Tom Smith, Duterte’s Latest Target: The Commission on Human Rights,
DIPLOMAT (Aug. ,
), https newsinfo.in uirer.net
chr-wants-govtto-intensify-efforts-to-deliver- ustice-for-all-e k-victims (discussing Duterte’s
disparaging pronouncements to the Commission); see also ‘Gay or Paedophile?’
Philippines Duterte Attacks Rights Chief Over Drug War Criticism, GUARDIAN
(Sept.
,
), https www.theguardian.com world
sep
gay-orpaedophile-philippines-duterte-attacks-rights-chief-over-drug-war-criticism.
. See Bea Cupin, Alvarez Wants P1,000 Budget for CHR That ‘Doesn’t Do Its
Job’, RAPPLER (Sept. ,
), https www.rappler.com nation
-speakeralvarez-budget-cut-commission-human-rights; see also Oliver Holmes, Philippines
MPs Vote to Slash Budget of Agency Investigating Drug War to £15, GUARDIAN
(Sept.
,
), https www.theguardian.com world
sep
philippinesbudget-agency-investigating-drug-war.
. See id.
. See, e.g., Johnson Fern uest, supra note ,
(stating that
of
the populace reported being satisfied with the government crackdown on drugs).
. See Gatmaytan, supra note
, at
(stating Duterte channels his
supporters’ fears and resentments); Alfred W. McCoy, Philippine Populism: Local
Violence and Global Context in the Rise of a Filipino Strongman, SURVEILLANCE
SOC’Y
,
(
) (describing Duterte’s public killing of drug dealers).
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a problem in the Philippines, it is not as severe as Mr. Duterte
presented it to be. Statistics have shown that substance abuse has been
declining, and crime rates are falling. But Mr. Duterte exaggerated
the problem and continues to do so by inflating the numbers. In the
process, he was able to dehumanize those involved in drug-use as
beyond redemption and worthy of extermination.
Finally, in
this crisis he created and portrayed as a threat to the state, he managed
to convince the population that exceptional measures, violative of
human rights, were re uired to solve it. The populace, promised
solutions, though painful, remain ac uiescent, if not eager, to agree.
Recent opinion polls on the matter are uite telling. Around
of the respondents said that they were satisfied with the campaign
against illegal drugs. Moreover, the remarkable ratings of the
Duterte administration were seen in all classes and in all the main
geographical divisions of the country.
The public remains
ambivalent when it comes to the claims of unlawful killings. While
of the respondents said that they do not believe the claims of
authorities concerning the deaths in the government’s illegal narcotics
. See Thompson, supra note , at .
. See Dharel Placido, Duterte Fires Drugs Board Chief for ‘Contradicting’
Government, ABS-CBN NEWS (May
,
), https news.abscbn.com news
duterte-fires-drugs-board-chief-for-contradictinggovernment; Trisha Macas, Duterte Sacks DDB Chief for Contradicting Gov’t Drug
Users
Count,
GMA
NEWS
(May
,
),
https www.gmanetwork.com news news nation
duterte-sacks-ddb-chieffor-contradicting-gov-t-drug-users-count story .
. See Gatmaytan, supra note , at ; see also Eliza Mackintosh, ‘Toxic’
Political Rhetoric Threatens Human Rights, Amnesty Warns, CNN (Feb. ,
),
https edition.cnn.com
world amnesty-human-rights-report index.html
(warning against toxic rhetoric that dehumanizes groups of people).
. See Thompson, supra note
, at
(describing this approach as
perform ing a crisis ).
. See Curato, supra note
, at
(discussing how Duterte wins over
audiences with his rhetoric).
. See, e.g., June 27-30, 2018 Social Weather Survey: Satisfaction With
National Admin’s Campaign Against Illegal Drugs at net +65, SOC. WEATHER
STATIONS
(Sept.
,
),
http sws.org.ph swsmain artcldisppage
artcsyscode ART.
. See id.
. uimpo, supra note , at
.
. See Johnson Fern uest, supra note ,
(suggesting polls on the
sub ect vary depending on the wording of the uestion).
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campaign, the same number said that they trust the authorities, and an
additional
said that they were undecided.
The results may be a symptom of the Philippines’ failed discourse
of democracy, where human rights and the rule of law had become a
suffocating strait acket for a ma ority of the Filipinos who could not
simply relate to it.
Worse, it may also be a confirmation of the
public’s wilful disregard for the extent to which the police are
involved in the killings.
The latter explains the openness of the
populace to Mr. Duterte’s illiberal methods. With the public’s loss of
confidence in state institutions, particularly the udicial system,
coupled with the frustration with the government’s inability to
provide basic security, leaders who present themselves to be able to
take a decisive action to provide security, no matter the cost, have
become widely popular.

V. STRENGHTENING DOMESTIC NONGOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
The illiberal agenda espoused by regimes like that of Mr. Duterte’s
almost always run in conflict with the principles of international
human rights. The rise of these governments, in turn, puts up a
challenge to the human rights movement in a way that is
fundamentally different from the others it has previously
confronted. For instance, there has been an essential antipathy and
even hostility towards the field of human rights such that an
increasing number of governments have expressed an intent to
disregard the key pillars of the field. There has also been an
observed breakdown in respect for its principles thereby undermining
. See Fourth Quarter Social Weather Survey: 28% of Filipinos Do Not Believe
Police Claims of “Nanlaban”, 28% Believe, and 44% are Undecided, SOC.
WEATHER
STATIONS
(Feb.
,
),
https www.sws.org.ph swsmain artcldisppage artcsyscode ART.
. Curato, supra note , at .
. Johnson Fern uest, supra note , at
; Lamchek, supra note
, at
,
.
. See Curato, supra note , at .
. See Alston, supra note , at
. See generally STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE
ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(
) (discussing other modern human rights
violations).
. See Alston, supra note , at .
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the international rule of law. Worse, more and more states have
threatened to pull out of international institutions highlighting their
fragility. Accordingly, the possibility of effective pushback is now
evaporating.
The problem is, like any other field of international law, the
international human rights enterprise depends on the cooperation of
states. Conse uently, the adherence of states to the principles it
promotes is of utmost importance. To stress the point, one of the
underlying presumptions in human rights instruments is the existence
of a supranational body that has the ability to assess the
implementation of derogation measures and monitor the limitations on
rights made under the instruments.
Simply put, institutional
reinforcement remains important as international law cannot
guarantee its efficacy. However, while many of these human rights
bodies have been endowed with powers and procedures for monitoring
and reporting, addressing individual and inter-state complaints, and
initiating motu proprio in uires, the cooperation of states remains
integral. Thus, without genuine fulfilment of obligations by states
and their corresponding cooperation with human rights bodies, the
accession of states to human rights instruments becomes a mere lipservice or a fa ade for legitimacy and credibility to external actors.

law).

. See id. at

(describing shocking breakdown of international rule of

. See id. at .
. See id. at .
. See Scott Sheeran, The Relationship of International Human Rights Law and
General International Law: Hermeneutic Constraint, or Pushing the Boundaries?,
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ,
(Scott Sheeran Nigel Rodley eds.,
); Ted Piccone, The Future of the United
Nations Special Procedures, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
,
(Scott Sheeran Nigel Rodley eds.,
).
. See id. at
.
. Gemmo Bautista Fernandez, Within the Margin of Error: Derogations,
Limitations, & the Advancement of Human Rights, PHIL. L.J. , (
).
. See id.
. See id.
. See POOLE, supra note , at ,
(
) (stating that normative prodemocracy statements may boost legitimacy); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al.,
Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties,
INT’L ORG.
,
(
) (describing derogations as insincere acts); Andrew
Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, INT’L ORG.
,
(
) (noting that most human rights

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
The scenario then is this because illiberal regimes receive little or
no disincentives in the domestic plane, these regimes have the free rein
to disregard their respective human rights obligations. In turn, this
results in a decline in the effectiveness of international human rights
mechanisms. For one, it results in problems such as securing
reliable, complete and contemporaneous information about state
compliance with international human rights instruments and their
concomitant procedures. The Philippines, for instance, declared a
state of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
covering the entire island of Mindanao. As the proclamation
is a special measure amounting to a derogation within the purview of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Philippine
government has the obligation to comply with both the procedural and
substantive re uirements under the treaty. Yet, the government has
not lodged any notification, as re uired by the Covenant, concerning
its proclamation of a state of emergency.
Similarly, the national report submitted by the Philippine
government to the Human Rights Council during the country’s
Universal Periodic Review is far from being accurate.
Despite
regimes are not enforced by interstate action).
. See Ronald D. Holmes, Who Supports Rodrigo Duterte?, in A DUTERTE
READER CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY PRESIDENCY ,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) (discussing Duterte’s popularity despite his human rights
violations); Lamchek, supra note
, at
,
(noting Duterte has been able to
distance himself from such crimes); uimpo, supra note , at
(stating the
war on drugs has withstood criticism from media).
. See Fernandez, supra note
, at (noting the government’s disregard for
ICCPR notification re uirements).
. Id. at
.
. Id. at
.
. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. , adopted Dec.
,
,
U.N.T.S.
,
; CCPR General Comment No.
Article
Derogations During a State of Emergency,
, U.N. Doc.
CCPR C
Rev. Add
(Aug. ,
) (explaining notification re uirement).
. See Fernandez, supra note
, at .
. See UNHRC, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph Five
of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution
,
,
U.N. Doc.
A HRC WG.
PHL
(
) hereinafter UNHRC, Resolution
(reproducing Duterte’s claim that there is no State policy that promotes, condones,
sanctions or encourages extra udicial killings); Felipe Villamor, Duerte, Citing
Hitler, Says He Wants to Kill 3 Million Addicts in Philippines, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
,
), https www.nytimes.com
world asia philippines-rodrigoduterte-hitler-drugs.html (noting Duterte’s claim that he would be happy to
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evidence to the contrary, the report submits that all police and
military operations be conducted within the bounds of the law, and
recognizing and respecting the rights and dignity of the accused.
Moreover, it denies the existence of a state policy to kill drug offenders
even while it admits that Mr. Duterte has announced the contrary on
several occasions. It also argues that after conducting exhaustive
hearings, the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights reported
that there was no solid evidence to prove the existence of a statesponsored policy to commit killings to eradicate drugs.
What it
forgets to mention is the fact that the committee’s chair, Senator Leila
De Lima was imprisoned on trumped-up charges shortly after
initiating the in uiries.
The situation also contributes to the general inability of human
rights bodies to enforce their respective mandates. For instance,
states have fre uently asserted the inviolability of national sovereignty
and the prohibition against intervention and interference in the
domestic affairs of states in blocking re uests for monitoring, factfinding, or investigation by human rights bodies. Case and point, the
Philippines called the recent resolution of the United Nations Human
Rights Council seeking an international investigation on the killings
that occurred in the country’s campaign against illegal narcotics an

slaughter three million drug addicts in the Philippines).
. See UNHRC, Resolution
,
.
. Compare id. (stating that Duterte’s administration does not have a policy of
killing drug traffickers, criminals, or dissenters), with Villamor, supra note
(reporting that Duterte said he would finish the problem of the Philippines and
save the next generation from perdition by killing millions of drug addicts).
. See UNHRC, Resolution
, supra note
,
.
. See Johnson Fern uest, supra note , at
(stating that after calling for
an investigation into the extra udicial killings, Senator De Lima was imprisoned on
three counts of drug trafficking without evidence of drugs being leveled against her);
see also Lamchek, supra note
, at
(stating that the Victims Against Crime
and Corruption are responsible for the charges brought against Senator De Lima).
. See Fernandez, supra note
, at
(discussing the nature of
international human rights bodies and their inability to properly enforce noncompliance due to their limited status).
. See, e.g., Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a
Positive Law Context,
BROOK. J. INT’L L.
,
(
) (comparing the view
of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair that sovereignty is not as important as
human rights, to the view of some third world countries which tend to place more
importance on national sovereignty).
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outrageous interference on the country’s sovereignty. Worse, the
government threatened to withdraw from the Council and deny the
investigators entry to the country. Of course, the rhetoric employed
by governments like that of the Philippines is necessarily flawed.
International human rights obligations, by their nature, are not
essentially within the domestic urisdiction of the state. By ratifying
. See Jason Gutierrez, Philippines Hits Back at Call for U.N. Inquiry of Police
Killings,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
,
),
https www.nytimes.com
world asia philippines-killings-un.html
( uoting Salvador Panelo, the Philippine presidential spokesman, as having called
the UN’s investigation into extra- udicial killings an outrageous interference on
the country’s sovereignty); accord Hum. Rts. Council, Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights in the Philippines, U.N. Doc. A HRC
L.
(July ,
)
(ordering an investigation into human rights violations in the Philippines).
. See Patricia Lourdes Viray, Will the Philippines Quit UN Rights Body?,
PHIL.
STAR
(July
,
),
https www.philstar.com headlines
will-philippines- uit-unrights-body (stating that the Philippines has debated following the United States in
leaving the Human Rights Council); see also Panelo: UN Investigators to Be
Refused
Entry,
Denied
Visas,
CNN PHIL.
(July
,
),
https cnnphilippines.com news
Sal-Panelo-UN-investigators-refusedentry.html (stating that U.N. investigators would not be allowed entry into the
Philippines).
. See Gemmo Fernandez, How the Philippine Government Gets the Concept
of
‘Intervention’
Wrong,
DIPLOMAT
(Jan.
,
)
https thediplomat.com
how-the-philippine-government-gets-the-conceptof-intervention-wrong (discussing the rhetoric used by the Philippines when it
comes to intervention and interference with its national sovereignty by other
States, and why it is wrong to interpret those terms in the way that it does).
. See Abdulrahim P. Vi apur, The Question of Domestic Jurisdiction and the
Evolution of United Nations Law of Human Rights, INT’L STUD.
,
(
)
(articulating that human rights are not within the domestic urisdiction of States due
to the fact that the UN Charter obligates all member states to comply with the
international obligation to respect human rights); see also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(
) (stating that although
there does not appear to be a provision of the Charter which compels human rights
protection, and although the agencies tasked by the Charter with human rights
implementation do not have binding authority, Member States are still obligated by
the Charter to respect and observe fundamental human rights and freedoms); accord
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD , (Thomas Buergenthal ed.,
) (stating that it is possible for a matter to diffuse itself from domestic
urisdiction and into international urisdiction by membership to an international
organization such as the U.N., via the necessary compliance with the U.N. Charter);
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOLUME PEACE
(Robert Jennings
Arthur Watts eds., th ed.
) (representing that there is a substantial body of law
that suggests that if a State commits human rights abuses on its own people, there is
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human rights instruments, states have undertaken to observe specific
obligations and opened up its reserved domain for scrutiny and
observation not ust to the bodies tasked with doing so, but to the
international community as well. The measures for monitoring and
enforcement embodied in those treaties, therefore, could not be
considered as intervention or interference.
The same strategy was employed by Mr. Duterte’s government with
regard to the International Criminal Court. To recall, the Office of
the Prosecutor announced that it was opening a Preliminary
Examination to determine whether the situation in the Philippines met
the legal criteria established by the Rome Statute to warrant an
investigation as to whether the killings that occurred under the
government’s campaign against illegal narcotics constitute grave
a breaking point where intervention by other States, even in this matter of sovereign
urisdiction, may intervene in the abusing State’s affairs); Bruce S. Kessler, Politics
Among the Airwaves: An Analysis of Soviet and Western Perspectives on
International Broadcasting and the Right to Exchange Ideas and Information
Regardless of Frontiers, HOUS. J. INT’L L.
,
(
) (stating ways in
which items which might have been domestic urisdiction originally have become
or might become under international urisdiction).
. See Vi apur, supra note
, at
(stating that in ratifying human rights
instruments, States have essentially acknowledged the power of other States to
intervene in their domestic urisdiction to prevent or stop violations of human
rights); see also Virginia Leary, When Does the Implementation of International
Human Rights Constitute Interference in the Essentially Domestic Affairs of a State?
The Interaction of Articles 2 (7), 55 and 56 of the Charter, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE
(James Tuttle ed.,
) (stating that
actions taken by the UN to investigate violations of human rights by a country which
has signed onto a treaty outside of the UN charter and general U.N. rights, to protect
human rights, would not constitute interference, but that it might be interference to
send such a commission without permission in the event where it was merely related
to violation of general obligations under the U.N. charter); accord Thomas
Buergenthal, Codification and Implementation of International Human Rights, in
HUMAN DIGNITY THE INTERNATIONALI ATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ,
(Alice
H. Henkin ed.,
).
. See Kessler, supra note
, at
(stating that due to the nature of certain
agreements, the issue of human rights now lays outside of a State’s exclusive
domestic urisdiction, therefore criticism or concern from other States on an
international level is not considered intervention or interference).
. See Full Text: Duterte’s Statement on Int’l Criminal Court Withdrawal,
RAPPLER (Mar. ,
), https rappler.com nation full-text-philippines-rodrigoduterte-statement-international-criminal-court-withdrawal ( uoting a statement
from Duterte in which he rebuked the International Criminal Court’s attempt to place
him under international urisdiction, prompting him to declare the Philippines’
withdrawal of ratification of the Rome Statute).
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infringements of human rights amounting to a crime against
humanity.
Unsurprisingly, the announcement was received
negatively by Mr. Duterte and his allies.
The executive branch
belittled the development, expressing confidence that the complaint
would not prosper because the narcotics crackdown was a legitimate
law enforcement effort.
As with other international bodies, the
government alleged that the Court’s actions amounted to an
interference in the country’s sovereignty. It thus declared that it
will do everything it can to block the . . . investigators from gathering
data and conducting interviews in the Philippines.
Mr. Duterte
himself maintained that he will not allow himself to be investigated by
the Court. A little over a month after the announcement of the Office
of the Prosecutor, Mr. Duterte declared that he was withdrawing the
Philippines from the Statute.
. See Fatou Bensouda, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on Opening Preliminary Examinations into the
Situations in the Philippines and in Venezuela, ICC (Feb. ,
), https www.icccpi.int Pages item.aspx name
-otp-stat
(initiating
a
preliminary
examination into the extra- udicial killing situation in the Philippines).
. See generally RAPPLER, supra note
(expressing Duterte’s disposition
toward the UN and the ICC after the Prosecutor of the ICC’s opening of a
preliminary examination into extra udicial killings in the Philippines).
. See Alexis Romero, Duterte Reiterates Resolve to Fight Drugs, PHIL. STAR
(Feb. ,
), https www.philstar.com headlines
dutertereiterates-resolve-fight-drugs (stating that the government of the Philippines is
confident that the ICC’s complaint about their narcotics crackdown would fail
because their operations were legitimate).
. See Pia Ranada, ICC Investigators to be Denied Entry, Deported if they Visit
PH to Probe Drug War, RAPPLER (Mar. ,
), https rappler.com nation iccinvestigators-to-be-denied-entry-deported-visit-philippines-probe-drug-war
( uoting Duterte as stating that the ICC was interfering in the sovereignty of the
Philippines by trying to sub ect the country to its urisdiction).
. See id.
. See generally Jail Me, Hang Me: Philippines’ Duterte Says Won’t Answer
to ICC, REUTERS (Dec. ,
), https www.reuters.com article us-philippinesdrugs ail-me-hang-me-philippines-duterte-says-wont-answer-to-iccidUSKBN YO
( uoting Duterte’s statement that he will be udged only by the
Philippines and that he will not cooperate with the international community).
. See Felipe Villamor, Philippines Plans to Withdraw from International
Criminal
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
,
),
https www.nytimes.com
world asia rodrigo-duterte-philippinesicc.html (stating that Duterte made a statement withdrawing the Philippines from the
Rome Statute after claiming the ICC was being utilized as a tool against the
Philippines).
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Finally, the situation is made worse by the fact that illiberal states,
and those that are in the slide towards illiberalism, tend to create what
may be considered as an international shield.
These states build
what may be considered an alliance of tolerance where they would
be unwilling to criticise each other, let alone oin any international
effort to sanction them for domestic wrongdoings.
For instance,
during the Philippines’ recent Universal Periodic Review, illiberal
states like China, refrained from criticising the former’s campaign
against illegal narcotics and instead expressed support for it. The
same happened in the case of a resolution calling for action in response
to the unresolved killings in the Philippines.
In return, the
Philippines has supported and defended these states from the
criticisms made against them.
This alliance’ goes beyond diplomacy and may consist of material
. See, e.g., Corrales, supra note , at
(discussing Venezuela’s creation of
the international shield by creating an alliance of tolerance which would allow
them to have allies who would refuse to criticize or sanction them in their actions).
. See id.; see, e.g., Josie Ensor, Saudi Crown Prince Defends China’s Right to
Put Uighur Muslims in Concentration Camps, TELEGRAPH (Feb.
,
),
https www.telegraph.co.uk news
saudi-crown-prince-defends-chinasright-put-uighur-muslims-concentration (describing China and Saudi Arabia’s
formation of what Corrales might describe as an alliance of tolerance, promoting
human rights violations under the guise of strengthening international cooperation
on de-radicalisation ).
. See UNHRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review Philippines,
, U.N. Doc. A HRC
(July ,
).
. See UNHRC, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Philippines,
U.N. Doc. A HRC
L. (July ,
) (note that China, a member of the Human
Rights Council, did not sign on to this Report); Mia M. Gonzales, Meet PH’s New
Friends: U.N.-Member Countries that Voted vs Human Rights Resolution, RAPPLER
(July
,
), https rappler.com newsbreak i countries-voted-against-unhuman-rights-resolution-philippines-killings (stating that China, among other
countries which have uestionable human rights records, sided with the Philippines
in a resolution calling for action against the killings in the Philippines).
. See, e.g., Abbas Faiz, China is Building a Global Coalition of Human Rights
Violators to Defend its Record in Xinjiang – What is its Endgame?, CONVERSATION
(July
,
), https theconversation.com china-is-building-a-global-coalitionof-human-rights-violators-to-defend-its-record-in-xin iang-what-is-its-endgame(stating that the Philippines was one of the countries to sign a oint letter to
the UN in support of China’s treatment of Uyghurs in the in iang region); see also
Catherine Putz, Which Countries are For or Against China’s Xinjiang Policies?,
DIPLOMAT (July ,
), https thediplomat.com
which-countries-arefor-or-against-chinas-xin iang-policies (showing the Philippines’ defense of
China’s placing of Uyghurs into vocation education and training centers ).
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aid. When more liberal states condition aid or investment based on
their liberal principles, illiberal states would tend to look towards
friendlier’ states for alternative sources of trade and assistance which
can be procured without the accompanying political conditions.
Such a scenario has been evident in the Philippines where Mr. Duterte
shunned all financial assistance from the countries critical of his
policies. Of course, Mr. Duterte could afford to do so given that
countries like China are willing to grant loans, while others like
Russia are open to providing aid without the conditions related to
the Philippines’ human rights practices.
Given the foregoing, it appears that relying on international law and
diplomacy alone may not provide a solution to the problems of
. See, e.g., Ellie Aben, Moscow to Supply State-of-the-Art Weapons to Manila,
ARAB NEWS (Sept. ,
), https www.arabnews.com node
world
(illustrating Russia’s willingness to contribute weapons to the Philippines’ armed
forces to contribute toward lasting peace and stability in the region ); China Offers
$14 Million Arms Package to the Philippines: Manila’s Defense Minister, REUTERS
(Dec.
,
), https www.reuters.com article us-philippines-china-armsidUSKBN
HN (describing China’s gift of military e uipment to aid the
Philippines’ war on drugs).
. See Alexander Cooley, Authoritarianism Goes Global: Countering
Democratic Norms,
J. DEMOCRACY ,
(
) (discussing the way illiberal
states can manipulate NGOs, regional organizations, and potential financiers in
order to avoid political conditions attached to aid); see also POOLE, supra note ,
at
(stating that with the lack of international consensus as to what human rights
norms might be, ASEAN member states may feel less pressured to comply with
Western ideals, especially when considering China’s sphere of influence in the IndoPacific region).
. See, e.g., Ben O. de Vera, Duterte Order Shuns All Loans, Grants, Aid from
18 Countries Backing Probe of PH Killings, IN UIRER (Sept.
,
),
https business.in uirer.net
duterte-order-shuns-all-loans-grants-aid-from-countries-in-favor-of-probe-of-ph-killings (citing examples of Duterte turning
down foreign grants with conditions attached from the European Union after the
European Union’s criticism of Duterte’s war on drugs).
. See, e.g., Andreo Calonzo, Duterte Defends China Loans as Critics Warn of
Unfavorable Terms, BLOOMBERG (Mar. ,
) (stating that China has provided
. million to the Philippines in loans).
. See Aben, supra note
(stating that Russia is providing military
e uipment to the Philippines’ armed forces); see also REUTERS, supra note
(stating that China is also supplying military aid to the Philippines in the form of
small arms, fast boats, and night vision goggles).
. See de Vera, supra note
( uoting Philippines Finance Secretary Carlos
Dominguez III as saying that the Philippines would not deal with a developmental
partner who tied human rights to conditions of aid but would deal with countries that
did not include such provisions in their agreements).
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enforcement of human rights in illiberal states like the Philippines.
Neither would a recourse to domestic mechanisms by itself be
effective seeing that these have been greatly depreciated. Thus,
innovative thinking and creative strategizing that are urgently needed
on the part of human rights advocates to be able to find workable
methods in view of the threats that the field now faces.
One viable option is to turn to and strengthen domestic nongovernment institutions such as civil society organizations. This is
promising especially in the Southeast Asian context where human
rights groups have been observed to have engaged in debates about
democracy and human rights and have been keen observers and
contributors to dialogue with governments. Moreover, these groups
have continuously lobbied for accountability and transparency and
sought to play a role in generating ideas and in influencing norms.
. See Alston, supra note
, at
(stating that turning to domestic
mechanisms for enforcement of human rights in illiberal states would not be
productive due to the general disdain for social conventions on which human
rights are built upon which is inherent in such illiberal, populist-authoritarian states).
. See id. at (stating that human rights advocates must engage in innovative
thinking and creative strategizing in order to re-evaluate their strategies, and
broaden their outreach, while not giving up on the basic principles in order to build
the field up).
. See U.N. Secretary-General, Delivering Justice: Programme of Action to
Strengthen the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels,
,
U.N.
Doc. A
(Mar. ,
) hereinafter Delivering Justice (stating that the UN
can help strengthen the rule of law at the international and national levels through
civil society organizations, which make important contributions to strengthening
services that ensure the rule of law ).
. See POOLE, supra note , at (stating that civil society organizations may
be useful in strengthening human rights in Southeast Asian urisdictions because
they have been keen observers of and contributors to the formation of the ASEAN
Intergovernmental Convention on Human Rights); see also Kelly Gerard,
Explaining ASEAN’s Engagement of Civil Society in Policy-making: Smoke and
Mirrors,
GLOBALI ATIONS
,
(
) (stating that civil society
organizations have risen as a force in challenging the growth at all costs agenda
pursued by authoritarian states with regard to the conse uences of the actions of
these states); Maria-Gabriela Manea, The Claims of the ASEAN to Human Rights
and Democracy: What Role for Regional Civil Society?,
ASIEN , ,
(
) (discussing the role which regional civil societies have been able to carve out
for themselves in ASEAN human rights promotion and protection).
. See POOLE, supra note , at
( I t is important to note here that certain
non-state actors lobby for accountability and transparency in ASEAN, and seek to
play a role in generating ideas and in influencing regional norms. ); Mandeep
Tiwana, Response Strategies to Push Back Against the Global Crackdown on Civil
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In other cases, most human rights groups have done the heavy
lifting in leading activities aimed towards the information gathering
re uired to disprove official denials of gross human rights
violations. In the Philippines, data from Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and the Peace Research Institute has played a
ma or role in providing a picture of the true cost of the drug war
especially at a time when the government refuses to be transparent.
Conse uently, ensuring effective synergies between international
and local human rights movements may be a key in con unction with
focusing on building or complementing national capacity.
But as much as civil society organizations have been engaging
governments, they likewise need to engage with the populace as
well. Here, civic education has the capacity to teach people to
recognize threats to their liberty and well-being. While illiberal
leaders have devoted efforts in the pursuit of easing the populace to
illiberal and often authoritarian ideas, so too must the civil society
pursue a commitment to liberal and democratic principles. This is
especially true in states like the Philippines which have undergone a
cycle of liberal and illiberal regimes.
Society, in RISING TO THE POPULIST CHALLENGE A NEW PLAYBOOK FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ACTORS
,
(C sar Rodr guez-Garavito Krizna Gomez eds.,
)
(explaining how accountability and transparency may be useful to civil societies in
their missions to resist authoritarian measures and attacks on democratic ideals).
. See Lamchek, supra note
, at
,
(stating that Duterte has had to
deny reports from the media and human rights organizations which had performed
research and information gathering to implicate the government of the Philippines
in extra udicial killings related to Duterte’s war on drugs).
. See id. at
(citing the highlights from
reports from Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and the Peace Research Institute to illustrate
the information debunk Duterte’s claims that the extra udicial killings are
legitimate).
. See Alston, supra note , at (discussing the idea that large international
NGOs might be more effective by establishing a synergy with the local or national
human rights movements).
. Cf. Scheppele, supra note , at
(stating that democratic publics should
be educated about liberal constitutionalism in order to better recognize what the
danger signs might be which threaten their governmental system).
. See id. (discussing the importance of civic education for the public).
. See Walker, supra note , at
(stating that democracies must engage in
civic education with the same vigor as authoritarians pursue education of
authoritarian ideals if liberal democracy is to survive).
. See Teehankee, supra note , at
(analyzing the way the prevailing
public opinion and ideology can shape the performance of a President and how the
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These organizations have the potential to educate the public about
the conse uences of subscribing to the policies of authoritarians like
Mr. Duterte. In some countries, civic organizations managed to
inform and engage with their communities to the extent that they have
denied politicians the opportunity to frame the uestions or determine
the answers.
This has allowed the public to reoccupy the political
space that had been captured by party machines and top-down
government.
This, in turn, resulted in, among others, a massive
re-engagement in politics, particularly among marginalised groups,
and dramatic improvements in local life.
narratives crafted by political agents may influence leadership in a country); see also
Kenneth E. Foote
Maoz Azaryahu, Toward a Geography of Memory:
Geographical Dimensions of Public Memory and Commemoration,
J. POL.
MIL. SOC’Y
,
(
) (discussing ways in which public memory is
produced and influenced, leading to the formation of a national narrative and a
collective identity of who the people of the nation are); cf. Cleve Kevin Robert V.
Arguelles, Duterte’s Other War: The Battle for EDSA People Power’s Memory, in
A DUTERTE READER CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RODRIGO DUTERTE’S EARLY
PRESIDENCY
,
(Nicole Curato ed.,
) (discussing how Duterte’s
movement of Marcos, a past leader of the Philippines’ body to a place of honor in
Manila contributes to the resetting of the national memory to be more conducive to
authoritarian rule).
. See Scheppele, supra note
, at
(describing the need to educate
democratic publics about the dangers of authoritarian policies and what the warning
signs might look like, so future generations might avoid the rise of new authoritarian
regimes).
. See, e.g., George Monbiot, There is an Antidote to Demagoguery – It’s
Called
Political
Rewilding,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
,
),
https www.theguardian.com commentisfree
dec
demagogues-powerrewilding-party-trust-power-government (using local programs in Brazil, Spain, and
Iceland to show that movements centered around mass participation by the public in
government have been able to reoccupy political spaces previously captured by
party machines before authoritarianism could rear its head).
. See id.; see, e.g., George Monbiot, Why ‘the Will of the People’ is a Myth in
British
Democracy,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
,
),
https www.theguardian.com commentisfree
oct
will-of-the-peoplebritish-democracy (suggesting deliberative democracy, and citing the Brazilian city
of Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting program and the Icelandic city of
Reyk av k’ Better Reyk av k program as successes where the public has occupied a
part of the political space for the betterment of the cities); Bernardo Guti rrez,
Madrid as a Democracy Lab, OPEN DEMOCRACY (July
,
),
https www.opendemocracy.net en democraciaabierta madrid-as-democracy-lab
(describing a movement in Madrid, Spain to create space for the public in the
governance of the city).
. See Monbiot, supra note
(noting that the implementation of participatory
politics has resulted in a massive re-engagement in politics, particularly among
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In the Philippines, these organizations have helped clarify the
muddled public udgments about the illiberal policies of
governments, the responsibility for the rising number of deaths, and
its potential long-term effects. They have also articulated how
official explanations of the government related to the its human rights
violations do not make sense. Of course, it is understood that these
groups have long been discredited by people like Mr. Duterte as out
of touch or to be part of plots con ured by their opposition.
Nonetheless, despite being branded as such, these organizations have
seen some degree of success. For example, the civic organizations’
actions in highlighting corruption and demonstrating how the
campaign against illegal narcotics abetted corrupt practices by the
police had some degree of resonance with the public. Mr. Duterte
was forced to admit that there may be corruption within the agencies
charged with enforcing his campaign thus paving the way for its brief
suspension in
.
marginalized groups, and dramatic improvements in local life ); see, e.g., Dmytro
Khutkyy, Participatory Budgeting: An Empowering Democratic Institution,
EURO INE (Oct. ,
), https www.eurozine.com participatory-budgeting-anempowering-democratic-institution (stating that participatory politics attracts
higher levels of participation among marginalized groups than local elections do in
New York City, indicating that such participatory programs do in fact promote reengagement in politics by those who either were not involved or stopped being
involved before).
. See Lamchek, supra note
, at
,
(stating that the reports published
by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt might help the public come to conclusions about police involvement in
extra udicial killings).
. See id. at
(stating that the reports by Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt provide information to the
public which debunks official explanations for the extra udicial killings).
. See id. (stating that Duterte has openly expressed disdain for groups such as
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt and claimed that they are out of touch with reality, in attempts to discredit
their research and reports).
. See, e.g., id. (citing the fact that few people believe Duterte’s endorsed theory
of extra udicial killings and that people are worried they might be killed next, as
evidence that the research reports published by human rights groups in the
Philippines have seen some success).
. See id. at
(citing the human rights organizations’ efforts to expose police
corruption as successful, considering that Duterte even admitted that there was
substantial police corruption, going so far as to suspend police operations to
cleanse the department).
. See id. (stating that the human rights organizations’ efforts even forced
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Finally, a more relevant and inclusive dialogue must be employed.
In this regard, there are spaces for improvement of the strategies
employed by civil society organizations and human rights advocates.
Much like how regimes similar to that of Mr. Duterte passed on
their message and found a language in which they could articulate the
people’s disappointment,
so too must civil society organizations
tap on their aspirations. Trying to stop the transition to illiberal
democracy with appeals to constitutionalism does not always work
because the restraints of liberalism are not always democratically
appealing when there seems to be a crisis of events and of
confidence with democratic institutions.
Thus, rather than
annunciating liberal democratic and human rights principles as
though they were self-evidently correct and applicable, more time
and effort should be devoted to making the dialogue relatable,
relevant, and persuasive.
First, the message has to be relatable. The public, beyond those
well-versed with the principles of liberal democracy and human rights,
needs to know that adherence to these principles matter. Yet, this
Duterte to suspend police activity to fix the corruption exposed within).
. See Enhancing Participation and Protecting Civic Space, OHCHR,
https www.ohchr.org EN AboutUs ManagementPlan Pages participation.aspx
(last visited Oct. ,
) (citing ways in which OHCHR intends to protect civic
space and those who stand up for human rights, strengthen monitoring of civic space,
build public recognition of the role of civic space, and mainstream civic space issues
in the UN system. ).
. E.g., McCargo, supra note , at
(citing examples of ways that
Duterte passed his message effectively on to voters leading up to his election as
President); see Cabanes Cornelio, supra note , at
(stating that trolls and
others who latched onto their messages found an efficient way to communicate
disappointments and aspirations which may have contributed to populism’s rise,
but could also possibly be effectively harnessed to fight populism); see also Walker,
supra note , at
(stating that democracies must pursue active communication
and education of their ideals in the same way that authoritarianism has in order to
stand a chance at avoiding further erosion of democratic space ).
. See Scheppele, supra note , at
(discussing how once democracy and
constitutionalism are threatened by crisis, it can be difficult for the public to
constrain themselves to constitutional norms, which can lead to authoritarianism in
the right environment).
. See Alston, supra note , at
(stating that in communicating democratic
and human rights ideals, it is important to be persuasive and convincing, which is
what authoritarianism has done, in order to properly combat its rise).
. See Kenneth Roth, The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on
Human Rights Values,
J. INT’L AFF. ,
(
) (stating that the general
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cannot be done when the language for advocacy caters only to those
trained to appreciate and understand them. Neither would it be
accomplished when the appeals to the public are made based on the
mere language and principles of liberal democracy and human rights
alone instead of a genuine engagement with their meaning and
implications. Thus, a better method of communication has to be put
in place. As one writer aptly puts, law is too important to leave only
to the lawyer.
What is needed is a citizenry trained to resist the
legalistic autocrats able to recognise their dangers and understand the
tools that may be used to resist them.
Second, the message has to be relevant. Autocrats, like Mr. Duterte,
have been successful in making the populace believe that rights are
not crafted to protect them from the state but rather undermine the
government’s efforts to protect them. They have been able to
persuade the electorate that those whose rights may be violated are not
the members of the general public, but are those who are not worthy
of the government’s protection in the Philippines, drug offenders; in

public at large should be aware that governments founded on human rights will both
function and treat them better, and that they have the power to demand a politics
based on truth and the values on which rights-respecting democracies have been
built ).
. See Scheppele, supra note , at
(declaring that if liberal democratic
ideals are to resonate with the public, they must stray from being elite and cater to
the general public).
. See Alston, supra note , at
(stating that appeals to liberal democratic
human rights might be more effective if explained more sufficiently in order to
convince that authoritarianism is not the way forward); see also Roth, supra note
,
at
( A
strong popular reaction, using every means available civic groups, political parties,
traditional and social media is the best defense of the values that so many still
cherish despite the problems they face. ).
. See Scheppele, supra note , at
(asserting that the citizens should be
educated in the law as well as lawyers, in order to resist the rise of legalistic
autocracy).
. See id. (stating that if citizens are trained to understand legal principles of
democracy, they will be better e uipped to handle and resist the rise of autocratic
government).
. See Kenneth Roth, The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on
Human Rights Values, HRW (Dec.
,
), https www.hrw.org worldreport
country-chapters dangerous-rise-of-populism ( T oday, a growing
number of people have come to see rights not as protecting them from the state but
as undermining governmental efforts to defend them. ).
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the United States and Europe, immigrants. In short, the public is
convinced to look at rights as protecting only these other people,
not themselves, and thus as dispensable.
In turn, the government
has convinced the public of the myth of the possibility of selective
enforcement of rights such that while the rights of those targeted may
be compromised, their rights would remain secure. What needs to
be stressed is that rights by their nature do not admit an la carte
approach.
Disregarding the application of rights in one segment of
the public would eopardize its enforcement in general.
Human
rights, after all, are not solely concerned about the protection of
minority groups and oppressed individuals. Every member of the
public has a stake in the human rights enterprise.
Third, the message has to be persuasive. While at its core, the notion
of human rights concerns the life, liberty, protection, and well-being
of an individual or the group of which they are a member, focus should
be made in communicating its importance and implications to the
populace. Greater attention must be paid in stressing that protecting
the lives and liberties of the members of the public allows the public,
in general, to demand from the state a rational devotion of its efforts
to safeguard the general well-being of its citizens within the

. See id. (stating that when encouraged by populists, the public may be
influenced to think that basic human rights which apply to all people, only apply to
the perceived threat group of people, and are therefore dispensable, thereby
handicapping their own access to the same rights).
. Id.
. See id. (stating that no matter what people believe, selective enforcement of
rights is impossible and that people who willingly accept violation of others’ rights
also compromise their own).
. See id. (arguing that people cannot pick and choose what rights they would
like enforceable for their neighbors without doing the same for themselves, as the
violation of some rights will inevitably lead to the erosion of others).
. See id. ( To violate the rights of some is to erode the edifice of rights that
inevitably will be needed by members of the presumed ma ority in whose name
current violations occur. ).
. See Roth, supra note
(indicating that human rights concern all parties,
and the ma ority will erode their own rights by imposing limitations on the rights of
minorities).
. But see Alston, supra note , at (acknowledging that the ma ority of
people feel as if they do not have a stake in the human rights enterprise ).
. See POOLE, supra note , at
(citing the lack of relevance of ASEAN for
many people as limiting on the influence it can have on the region).
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maximum of available resources, in the shortest possible time.
Simply, the end goal of the enterprise is not merely to safeguard the
individual from governmental power, but to demand that
governmental power be utilized to uplift the well-being of the public.
Accordingly, economic and social rights must be an important and
authentic part of the overall agenda instead of addressing it in a
manner that is tokenistic at best. In turn, this creates more resonance
with the public rather than the often-repeated human rights ideals.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The article began by contextualizing the Philippines’ continued
transition to an illiberal order. Dissatisfied with years of elite rule,
institutional deficits, and lack of inclusive growth, the populace
elected a president who was able to tap into this discontent. The
dis unction between the liberal political order’s promises and reality
allowed Mr. Duterte to convince the electorate to be open to trade-offs
and to an authoritarian alternative a narrative that remains intact
three years after his election.
This openness of the populace allowed Mr. Duterte to consolidate
his power. With popular support, political clout, and access to state
. See BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS ,
(
) (discussing how progressive realization re uires a state to utilize its
maximum resources while preserving a minimum core of human rights, which in
totality, will move a state in the right direction of safeguarding the rights of its
citizens).
. See id. (stating that the end goal of progressive realization re uires active
development of states in terms of preserving a minimum core of rights and utilizing
a maximum of the available resources).
. See Alston, supra note , at , (suggesting that despite economic and
social rights not being central to most modern human rights analyses, perhaps they
should be, because their elements of recognition, institutionalization, and
accountability are no different from the elements of political rights).
. See HEYDARIAN, supra note , at
(noting the A uino administration’s
struggles which set the stage for the rise of Duterte and authoritarian populism in the
Philippines).
. Cf. Alston, supra note , at (citing the trade-offs involved in postsecurity measures in the United States as an example of a state’s people being willing
to accept huge trade-offs in the name of security at the expense of certain rights such
as freedom of movement, privacy, and non-discrimination norms).
. See HEYDARIAN, supra note , at
(noting the troubles of the A uino
administration which lead to the rise of Duterte and the reasons why the public was
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machinery, he was able to weaken, if not dismantle, the mechanisms
in place to keep check on the power of the government. While
maintaining a superficial appearance of democracy and legality, his
government has employed a variety of methods to remove the checks
on its power, limit challenges to its rule, and undermine the
accountability of institutions while hiding its autocratic designs.
While undoubtedly legal, it nevertheless lacks the observance of the
rule of law that democratic and liberal constitutionalism re uire.
In turn, the rise of the illiberal order and that of authoritarian
legalism severely eroded the country’s capacity to enforce its human
rights obligations. The unabated extra- udicial killings that occur
during the government’s campaign against illegal narcotics serve as a
testament to the erosion of respect for human rights in the country.
The rise of legalistic authoritarians like Mr. Duterte is not a new
phenomenon. Yet with the rise of these kinds of governments, the
human rights movement now faces a fundamentally different
challenge. This has made international monitoring and enforcement
even more difficult than before. Thus, innovative thinking and
creative strategizing ( . . . ) are urgently needed on the part of human
rights advocates to be able to find workable methods in view of field’s
shortcomings. With both international and domestic mechanisms
so susceptible to believing in him); cf. Alston, supra note , at (stating that
security concerns and threats have in recent years, began to normalize states of
emergency, which in turn breeds the willingness of the public to sacrifice some of
their rights in the name of security, making it no surprise that after the problems
introduced in the A uino administration, the public would turn to Duterte’s
populism and authoritarianism to solve the problems of the previous administration).
. See, e.g., Corrales, supra note , at
(discussing the rise of Venezuela’s
authoritarian government, showing how similar it is to the way Duterte rose up).
. Cf. Scheppele, supra note , at
,
(describing ways in which
autocracies are rising to power and the efforts that they are taking to maximize their
own power and keep it).
. See id. at
(giving examples of the ground rules re uired for a liberal
constitutional government to continue to be as such).
. See Curato, supra note , at (describing the early results of Duterte’s war
on drugs as an illiberal fantasy in which thousands have been killed and human
rights obligations have been forsaken).
. See, e.g., Lasco, supra note
(giving examples of persons whose human
rights were violated via extra- udicial killing to illustrate the degree to which respect
for human rights has eroded in the Philippines).
. See Alston, supra note , at (stating that innovative thinking and creative
strategizing are urgently needed in order to re-evaluate human rights strategies to
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weakened, a viable option is to strengthen civil society organizations
which can lobby for transparency and accountability from
governments and engage with the populace in a more relevant and
inclusive dialogue.

combat waves of bad news which influence the rise of populism and fall of human
rights regimes).

